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EXPANDING CIVIL RIGHTS TO COMBAT
DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION ON THE
BASIS OF POVERTY
Michele Estrin Gilman*

ABSTRACT
Low-income people suffer from digital discrimination on the basis of
their socio-economic status. Automated decision-making systems, often
powered by machine learning and artificial intelligence, shape the opportunities of those experiencing poverty because they serve as gatekeepers to the
necessities of modern life. Yet in the existing legal regime, it is perfectly
legal to discriminate against people because they are poor. Poverty is not a
protected characteristic, unlike race, gender, disability, religion or certain
other identities. This lack of legal protection has accelerated digital discrimination against the poor, fueled by the scope, speed, and scale of big data
networks. This Article highlights four areas where data-centric technologies
adversely impact low-income people by excluding them from opportunities
or targeting them for exploitation: tenant screening, credit scoring, higher
education, and targeted advertising. Currently, there are numerous proposals to combat algorithmic bias by updating analog-era civil rights laws for
our datafied society, as well as to bolster civil rights within comprehensive
data privacy protections and algorithmic accountability standards. On this
precipice for legislative reform, it is time to include socio-economic status
as a protected characteristic in antidiscrimination laws for the digital age.
This Article explains how protecting low-income people within emerging
legal frameworks would provide a valuable counterweight against opaque
and unaccountable digital discrimination, which undermines any vision of
economic justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION

W

E live in a “datafied” society in which a vast network of public
and private entities collects and combines our personal data.1
The digital exhaust people emit as they search and shop online,
beam geolocation data from their smartphones, move through spaces
under digital surveillance, and engage on social media is algorithmically
combined with thousands of other data points into digital profiles.2 In
turn, these digital profiles “serve as gatekeepers to life’s necessities,” such
as jobs, housing, healthcare, and education.3 Algorithms determine your
credit score, affect your access to housing and employment, set the price
of your insurance, and even decide whether the police will consider you a
suspect.4 Numerous scholars and civil rights organizations have high-

1. See CARISSA VÉLIZ, PRIVACY IS POWER: WHY AND HOW YOU SHOULD TAKE
BACK CONTROL OF YOUR DATA 1–3 (2020).
2. See SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN
AMERICA 355–57 (2018); Geoffrey A. Fowler, It’s the Middle of the Night. Do You Know
Who Your iPhone Is Talking To?, WASH. POST (May 28, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/28/its-middle-night-do-you-know-who-youriphone-is-talking [https://perma.cc/3JZE-AV4Z]; WOLFIE CHRISTL, CRACKED LABS CORPORATE SURVEILLANCE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 4–19 (June 2017), https://crackedlabs.org/en/
corporate-surveillance [https://perma.cc/U8TT-3JE2].
3. See MICHELE GILMAN, DATA & SOC’Y RSCH. INST., POVERTY LAWGORITHMS: A
POVERTY LAWYER’S GUIDE TO FIGHTING AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING HARMS ON
LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 1 (2020), https://datasociety.net/library/poverty-lawgorithms
[https://perma.cc/ZA8L-VZ3V].
4. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1–4 (2014).
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lighted the potential for algorithmic bias in these profiling systems, and
real-life examples of digital discrimination are ubiquitous—algorithms
have administered lower quality health care to Black patients, learned to
prefer male job applicants over females, excluded minorities from seeing
certain housing advertisements, and more.5 As a result, numerous legislative proposals and emerging litigation strategies for countering algorithmic biases exist.6 These civil rights initiatives, however, have
excluded a group of Americans who are particularly vulnerable to digital
discrimination—people experiencing poverty.
American law generally does not protect people from discrimination
based on their socioeconomic status (SES).7 As a constitutional matter,
the Supreme Court has ruled that poverty is not an immutable characteristic and thus does not deserve heightened constitutional protection.8 As
a result, any law discriminating against the poor with a rational basis will
survive constitutional review.9 As a statutory matter, federal and state
civil rights laws protect against discrimination based on race, gender, disability, age, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, and genetic history, but they do not protect the poor.10 There are numerous reasons for
this exclusion, including the American belief in the myth of meritocracy,
which assumes a far greater capacity for social mobility than actually exists.11 This lack of legal protection has accelerated digital discrimination
against the poor, fueled by the scope, speed, and scale of big data
networks.
5. See infra Sections II.A., II.B.4.
6. See infra Section III.C.
7. Danieli Evans Peterman, Socioeconomic Status Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV.
1283, 1286–87 (2018).
8. Suspect classes receive greater constitutional protections. These are groups of people who have an immutable trait, who suffer from a history of prejudice and stereotyping,
and who lack a political voice. This framework was set forth in the famous footnote four of
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). The Court has
long recognized that race, national origin, alienage, and gender are suspect classes, and as a
result, legislation that draws lines on these bases is assessed with heightened scrutiny. See,
e.g., Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971);
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Poor people are not a suspect class.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1973) (holding that
strict scrutiny is inappropriate in a class action involving poor families’ claim to equal education funding).
9. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322–25 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 470–72 (1977); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28–29; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74
(1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
10. See infra Section II.A.
11. See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 70 (2007); James Jennings, Persistent Poverty in the United States:
Review of Theories and Explanations, in A NEW INTRODUCTION TO POVERTY: THE ROLE
OF RACE, POWER, AND POLITICS 13, 14–21 (Louis Kushnick & James Jennings eds., 1999)
(summarizing behavioral theories); Frank Munger, Identity as a Weapon in the Moral Politics of Work and Poverty, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW ETHNOGRAPHY OF
POVERTY, LOW-WAGE WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1, 3 (Frank
Munger ed., 2002).
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In the meantime, while low-income people are suffering in a datafied
society, businesses amass large profits at their expense, and governments
digitally deny them social safety-net supports.12 Algorithmic systems determine who will see online advertisements for desirable jobs and who
will be tracked into low-wage work,13 who will obtain an affordable mortgage and who will be redlined into predatory loans,14 and who will obtain
a college degree leading to a job and who will be targeted for high-interest loans to attend a for-profit school.15 Low-income people are usually
on the losing end of these classification systems.16 Without their knowledge, they are sorted out of categories of credit-worthiness, tenant-worthiness, worker-worthiness, and more.17 At the same time, they are
relentlessly targeted on the internet with offers for subprime financial
products and services. Indeed, an entire sector of the consumer reporting
industry exists to sell vulnerable consumers’ data to interested businesses.18 To obtain public benefits, low-income people must navigate
complex and often inaccessible online platforms that are not designed to
meet their needs.19 These automated decision-making systems often deny
or reduce benefits without transparency or due process, leaving
thousands of people adrift without state support and not knowing why.20
Layered on top of this data profiling are surveillance tools, such as facial
recognition technology, which are increasingly deployed in workplaces,
schools, and public housing to control poor and minority populations.21
Digital surveillance of student computers feeds the school-to-prison pipeline; predictive policing algorithms reinforce and expand policies of over
12. See generally Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty and Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U.
L. REV. 53, 61–64 (2017).
13. MIRANDA BOGEN & AARON RIEKE, UPTURN, HELP WANTED: AN EXAMINATION
OF HIRING ALGORITHMS, EQUITY, AND BIAS 14–25 (2018), https://apo.org.au/sites/default/
files/resource-files/2018-12/apo-nid210071.pdf [https://perma.cc/RNC5-PQUB].
14. Emmanuel Martinez & Lauren Kirchner, The Secret Bias Hidden in MortgageApproval Algorithms, MARKUP (Aug. 25, 2021, 6:50 AM), https://themarkup.org/denied/
2021/08/25/the-secret-bias-hidden-in-mortgage-approval-algorithms [https://perma.cc/
FTH2-5ZDJ].
15. See generally Maura Dundon, Students or Consumers? For-Profit Colleges and the
Practical and Theoretical Role of Consumer Protection, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375
(2015).
16. See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 3–4 (2016).
17. See generally id.
18. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, LIST OF CONSUMER REPORTING COMPANIES
31–33 (2022), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-reportingcompanies-list_2022-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/BNL7-2B8T].
19. Michele Estrin Gilman, Me, Myself, and My Digital Double: Extending Sara
Greene’s Stealing (Identity) From the Poor to the Challenges of Identity Verification, 106
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 301, 310–11 (2022).
20. See generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH
TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018); Sarah Valentine, Impoverished
Algorithms: Misguided Governments, Flawed Technologies, and Social Control, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 364 (2019).
21. See Michele E. Gilman, Five Privacy Principles (from the GDPR) the United States
Should Adopt to Advance Economic Justice, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 368, 394–99 (2020) [hereinafter Five Privacy Principles].
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policing and mass incarceration; and workplace algorithms monitor lowwage workers, shaping their performance in ways that cause physical and
psychological injuries.22 In short, low-SES people disproportionately bear
the brunt of harm in the datafied society.
As society makes greater efforts to rein in digital discrimination, the
time is right to consider expanding the categories of protected groups
under digital discrimination laws to include people of low SES. For this
Article’s purposes, digital discrimination laws include statutes addressing
digital civil rights, data privacy, and algorithmic accountability. Part I of
this Article describes the causes of algorithmic biases and maps the range
of harms facing low-income people as a result of digital profiling, automated decision-making systems, and surveillance systems. Part II sets
forth the landscape of existing antidiscrimination and data privacy laws
and explains how the law currently provides no protection against SES
discrimination in the digital context. It then provides an overview of proposed legislative reforms to enhance civil rights in digital privacy and algorithmic accountability. If enacted and enforced, these bills would
certainly provide important new tools for combatting digital discrimination but not directly address harmful practices that target, exclude, or
surveil people experiencing poverty. Part III thus proposes that any new
laws prohibiting digital discrimination include low SES as a protected
characteristic. It considers arguments for and against legal recognition of
SES in data-centric regimes and concludes that it would provide a valuable counterweight against the opaque and unaccountable digital exploitation of low-income people, which undermines any vision of economic
justice.
II. DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION
It is well known that algorithms can discriminate based on protected
characteristics, such as race and gender.23 Less discussed is discrimination
against people experiencing poverty when powerful entities deploy automated profiling and decision-making systems.24 This Part first describes
how purportedly neutral computational tools such as algorithms may nevertheless import biases against legally protected groups. With this background in mind, this Part then provides four case studies showing how
low-income people can also be targeted, excluded, and surveilled due to
their SES.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Nicol Turner Lee, Paul Resnick & Genie Barton, Algorithmic Bias Detection and Mitigation: Best Practices and Policies to Reduce Consumer Harms, BROOKINGS
(May 22, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-practices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-harms [https://perma.cc/JJG2-HZLF]
(describing examples of algorithmic bias in numerous settings).
24. See Gilman, supra note 21, at 375–90 (describing impacts of algorithmic decisionmaking on low-income people and minority groups).
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ALGORITHMIC

Almost every area of modern life is shaped by algorithmic decisionmaking. Algorithms underlie the technology used to diagnose diseases,
provide GPS navigation, recommend streaming entertainment, offer online financial services, book travel, host remote work meetings, deliver
advertising, connect people on social media, design buildings, provide online shopping, and more. Some definitions are helpful: in this context, an
algorithm is a set of mathematical instructions that tells a computer how
to complete a task.25 Automated decision-making uses algorithms to simplify complex decisions by dividing a single decision into several discrete
tasks performed on digital data.26 Algorithms range from the very simple,
such as running a decision tree, to the very complex.27 At the more complex level, some algorithms use machine learning—a form of artificial intelligence (AI)—to analyze large sets of data to recognize patterns or
make predictions.28
Algorithmic systems are powerful; they can analyze massive data sets
efficiently and consistently.29 However, ample evidence shows that algorithmic systems can contain embedded biases against certain groups,
potentially violating antidiscrimination law. Bias is not necessarily bad or
harmful; the term “simply refers to deviation from a standard.”30 In the
civil rights context, bias becomes problematic when “algorithms systematically perform less well for or penalize certain subgroups.”31 Algorithms
can appear objective compared to humans, who can be “infected by
bias.”32 Yet, because humans design the algorithms, these automated systems may reflect the biases of the individuals who made them.33
Examples abound: One prominent study revealed that a widely used
healthcare algorithm, which impacted the care of millions of patients
25. See HANNAH FRY, HELLO WORLD: HOW TO BE HUMAN IN THE AGE OF THE MA7–8 (2018).
26. See id. at 8.
27. See id. at 10–11 (noting the complexity of recent machine learning developments).
28. See id.; Kristin N. Johnson, Automating the Risk of Bias, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1214, 1236–38 (2019).
29. See Johnson, supra note 28, at 1239; FRY, supra note 25, at 198–99.
30. David Danks & Alex John London, Algorithmic Bias in Autonomous Systems, 26
PROC. INT’L JOINT CONF. ON A.I. 4691, 4692 (2017). “Thus, we can have statistical bias in
which an estimate deviates from a statistical standard (e.g., the true population value);
moral bias in which a judgment deviates from a moral norm; and similarly for regulatory or
legal bias, social bias, psychological bias, and others.” Id.
31. Alice Xiang, Reconciling Legal and Technical Approaches to Algorithmic Bias, 88
TENN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2021). See also Turner Lee, Resnick & Barton, supra note 23 (defining
bias as “a term that we define broadly as it relates to outcomes which are systematically
less favorable to individuals within a particular group and where there is no relevant difference between groups that justifies such harms”).
32. Laurel Eckhouse, Kristian Lum, Cynthia Conti-Cook, & Julie Ciccolini, Layers of
Bias: A Unified Approach for Understanding Problems with Risk Assessment, 46 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 185, 186 (2019).
33. See O’NEIL, supra note 16, at 21 (“Models are opinions embedded in mathematics.”); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV.
671, 674 (2016).
CHINE
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every year, was racially biased in identifying patients who needed “highrisk care management.”34 The algorithm recommended more intensive
levels of care to White patients—which, for the study’s purposes, counted
as any patients who did not identify as a race other than White—than to
similarly ill Black patients.35 The study concluded that this disparity occurred because the algorithm used prior healthcare costs to predict future
healthcare needs.36 Yet Black Americans face numerous barriers to
healthcare access, such as discrimination and underinsurance, so Black
patients’ cost histories are artificially lower than their White counterparts.37 Once this factor—prior healthcare costs—was eliminated from
the algorithm, the racial bias disappeared.38
Gender bias in algorithms is also a known problem.39 For instance,
Amazon tested (and then abandoned) a hiring algorithm designed to
identify “top talent” for technical jobs, but it proved biased against women.40 Programmers fed data into the algorithm culled from Amazon’s
prior ten years of resumes, in which males predominated.41 The algorithm
then linked the traits on those resumes to predictions about future success, thereby disfavoring resumes that contained words associated with
women, such as the names of women’s colleges or women’s sports
teams.42
Algorithms can also produce intersectional biases, harming individuals
whose identities span multiple protected categories. In a landmark study,
researchers Joy Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru concluded that facial recognition technology, which is used in various commercial and governmental settings, committed errors at higher rates for women of color than
for White men.43 Moreover, algorithms may be biased towards more than
one group. For example, many employers use video interviews in con34. Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli & Sendhil Mullainathan, Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 366 SCI. 447,
447 (2019).
35. See id.
36. See id. at 449.
37. See id. at 450.
38. See id. at 453.
39. See Michele Estrin Gilman, Feminism, Privacy and Law in Cyberspace, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FEMINISM AND LAW IN THE U.S. (Deborah L. Brake, Martha Chamallas &
Verna L. Williams eds., 2021).
40. Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against
Women, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2018, 6:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazoncom-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secretai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-biasagainst-women-idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/Q99T-FJ9E].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 77, 84 (2018).
Likewise, the ACLU conducted a study of Amazon’s facial recognition tool that falsely
identified twenty-eight members of Congress as criminals based on matches with a mugshot database, and representatives of color were far more likely to be falsely matched.
Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress with
Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/
surveillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28 [https://perma.cc/
4WES-6LNF].
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junction with assessment technologies to screen job candidates.44 The developers of these algorithms claim that they can analyze word selection,
facial expressions, tone of voice, and up to 500,000 other data points to
identify those candidates most likely to succeed.45 Critics charge that the
algorithms are no more than pseudoscience, with multiple potential biases.46 In a complaint filed with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
the Electronic Privacy Information Center alleged that the assessment
system sold by a company called HireVue produced biased and unprovable results.47 For instance, by tracking eye movement, the tool can discriminate against people with neurological differences.48 Research
suggests it will penalize certain emotional expressions made more frequently by Black candidates than White candidates.49
This brief overview of algorithmic bias just scratches the surface. Researchers, investigative journalists, and lawyers have uncovered algorithmic biases against almost every group protected under
antidiscrimination laws, including age,50 disability,51 religion,52 sexual ori-

44. BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 13, at 36–37.
45. Drew Harwell, A Face-Scanning Algorithm Increasingly Decides Whether You Deserve the Job, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2019/10/22/ai-hiring-face-scanning-algorithm-increasingly-decides-whether-you-deservejob [https://perma.cc/Z6NT-QU86].
46. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Automated Video Interviewing as the New Phrenology, 36
BERK. TECH. L. J. 101, 110 (2022) (“[T]here remains no scientific consensus that artificial
intelligence systems are capable of accurately interpreting human emotions from facial expressions.”); Mona Sloane, Emanuel Moss & Rumman Chowdhury, A Silicon Valley Love
Triangle: Hiring Algorithms, Pseudo-Science, and the Quest for Auditability, 3 PATTERNS 1,
3 (2022) (“Such claims have largely failed to demonstrate scientific validity, have not been
replicated experimentally, do not support the additional claims made by vendors that they
are useful in predicting on-the-job performance, and, most troublingly, replicate pseudoscientific and flawed research that posits imagined links between biology and
trustworthiness.”).
47. See Complaint and Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief Submitted by The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) at 1, 7, In re HireVue, Inc.,
(F.T.C. Nov. 6, 2019), https://epic.org/wp-content/uploads/privacy/ftc/hirevue/EPIC_
FTC_HireVue_Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZN9Z-QW5N].
48. See id. at 7, ¶ 43.
49. See id. at 8, ¶ 44.
50. E.g., Mark Dı́az, Isaac Johnson, Amanda Lazar, Anne Marie Piper & Darren Gergle, Addressing Age-Related Bias in Sentiment Analysis, 28 PROC. CHI CONF. ON HUM.
FACTORS COMPUTING SYS. 6146, 6149 (2019) (finding bias against older adults encoded in
sentiment analysis algorithms). See also MARTIM BRANDÃO, AGE AND GENDER BIAS IN
PEDESTRIAN DETECTION ALGORITHMS (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.10490.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H3LA-JZ5F] (finding that pedestrian detection algorithms are more likely to
miss child pedestrians).
51. E.g., Mason Marks, Algorithmic Disability Discrimination, in DISABILITY,
HEALTH, LAW AND BIOETHICS 242, 242–254 (Glenn Cohen Carmel Shachar, Anita Silvers
& Michael Ashley Stein eds., 2020) (discussing disability-based discrimination by AI mining for emergent medical data).
52. E.g., Abubakar Abid, Maheen Farooqi & James Zou, Large Language Models Associate Muslims with Violence, 3 NATURE MACH. INTEL. 461, 461–463 (2021).
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entation,53 national origin,54 pregnancy,55 familial status,56 and veteran
status.57
Algorithmic bias can be embedded at multiple stages of the algorithmic
design process. Developers exercise human judgment at numerous points
while developing an algorithm.58 People determine and define the algorithm’s goals and desired outputs; identify, collect, and clean the data
that feeds the models; select and apply an algorithmic model; screen results for errors and outliers and tweak the model accordingly; set the acceptable levels of false negatives and false positives; and interpret a
model’s outcomes.59 Errors and biases can be incorporated at any (or all)
of these stages.
To understand how a seemingly neutral technology can result in discrimination, consider four “layers of bias.” The four layers of bias, or
points at which bias can manifest, are as follows: (1) the values embedded
in the model; (2) the data used to train the model; (3) the ways humans
use the algorithm; and (4) the foundational decision to use group characteristics to make individualized determinations.60 At the first layer, an
algorithm’s designer determines how to achieve the users’ desired outcomes or targets.61 Examples of desired outcomes might include a college
seeking to predict which applicants will be most successful on campus; a
landlord attempting to identify which prospective tenants are likely to
make timely rent payments; or a lender wishing to assess the
creditworthiness of potential borrowers. These entities “might want to
use machine learning to find ‘good’ [students, tenants, or] employees to
hire, but the meaning of ‘good’ is not self-evident. Machine learning re53. E.g., Sophie Bishop, Influencer Management Tools: Algorithmic Cultures, Brand
Safety, and Bias, SOC. MEDIA + SOC’Y, Jan.–March 2021, at 1, 5, 8–9.(discussing the effect
of algorithmic bias against LGBTQ+ orientations in marketing).
54. E.g., Ryan S. Baker & Aaron Hawn, Algorithmic Bias in Education, INT’L J. A.I.
EDUCATION 15–16 (Nov. 18, 2021).
55. E.g., FREDERIK ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, DISCRIMINATION, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND ALGORITHMIC DECISION-MAKING 13–14 (2018) (noting an algorithm Target
employs to predict pregnancy for targeted marketing); Valentina Zarya, Employers Are
Quietly Using Big Data to Track Employee Pregnancies, FORTUNE (Feb. 17, 2016, 4:36
PM), http://fortune.com/2016/02/17/castlight-pregnancy-data [https://perma.cc/FF66-8XBJ].
56. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1169–70 (9th
Cir. 2008) (holding that a website that matched roommates with an algorithm based on
factors such as familial status was not immunized from Fair Housing Act violations by
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act).
57. E.g., Charles V. Bagli, Facebook Vowed to End Discriminatory Housing Ads. Suit
Says It Didn’t., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/nyregion/
facebook-housing-ads-discrimination-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/3XWA-DS8E].
58. David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 717 (2017) (machine learning
algorithms “are the complicated outputs of intense human labor”).
59. See id. at 672–702.
60. This “layers of bias” framework is inspired by and adapted from Eckhouse, Lum,
Conti-Cook & Ciccolini, supra note 32, at 187, in which the authors walk through three
ways bias can infect criminal risk prediction algorithms. While the authors’ approach is
focused on algorithms in the criminal legal system, it applies to any “area[ ] where datadriven decision-making tools are now in use.” Id.
61. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 58, at 672–77.
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quires specific and explicit definitions, demanding that those definitions
refer to something measurable.”62 Someone must craft these measurable
definitions; a computer cannot make these value choices. Thus, for example, a programmer necessarily must decide how to calculate whether students are “good” for the algorithm’s purposes. Will students be measured
by their grades, schools’ graduation rates, expected graduation date, use
of campus resources, or other factors? As Solon Barocas and Andrew
Selbst explain, “Through this necessarily subjective process of translation,
data miners may unintentionally parse the problem in such a way that
happens to systematically disadvantage protected classes.”63
Notably, the people making these value judgments do not represent the
impacted populations. In technical jobs and leadership positions, the tech
industry is overwhelmingly male and White or Asian.64 Only about 5% of
the workforce in Silicon Valley firms consists of Black, Hispanic, and Indigenous workers.65 At Google, only 2.5% of the workforce is Black; at
Facebook and Microsoft, 4%.66 Women hold roughly 25% of technical
jobs and even fewer leadership positions.67 These disparities stem, in part,
from employers preferring to recruit and hire workers who replicate their

62. Samir Passi & Solon Barocas, Problem Formulation and Fairness, 2019 PROC.
ACM CONF. ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 39, 39, https://doi.org/
10.1145/3287560.3287567 [https://perma.cc/6NUK-BPMJ].
63. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 33, at 678. Eckhouse and her co-authors describe this
layer as involving choices about fairness, but there are multiple ways to define fairness—
value choices must be made. Eckhouse, Lim, Conti-Cook & Ciccolini, supra note 32, at
189–90.
64. See Sara Harrison, Five Years of Tech Diversity Reports—and Little Progress,
WIRED (Oct. 1, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/five-years-tech-diversity-reports-little-progress [https://perma.cc/HF4F-R8A8]; Johnson, supra note 28, at 1225–27
(explaining the need for diversity in leadership positions for companies that develop and
adopt automated decision-making platforms); SARAH MYERS WEST, MEREDITH WHITTAKER & KATE CRAWFORD, AI NOW INST., DISCRIMINATING SYSTEMS: GENDER, RACE, AND
POWER IN AI 6 (2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/discriminatingsystems.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A4BD-68K2] (“Currently, large scale AI systems are developed almost exclusively in a handful of technology companies and a small set of elite university laboratories,
spaces that in the West tend to be extremely [W]hite, affluent, technically oriented, and
male.”).
65. See Maya Beasley, There Is a Supply of Diverse Workers in Tech, So Why Is Silicon
Valley So Lacking in Diversity?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 29, 2017), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2017/03/29/429424/supply-diverse-workerstech-silicon-valley-lacking-diversity [https://perma.cc/HB7Q-X4ZY]. Low-income people
toil for low wages at the lower rungs of the industry, including “ghost workers” and content
moderators. MARY L. GRAY & SIDDHARTH SURI, GHOST WORK: HOW TO STOP SILICON
VALLEY FROM BUILDING A NEW GLOBAL UNDERCLASS 2–8 (2019); SARAH T. ROBERTS,
BEHIND THE SCREEN: CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 33–38
(2019).
66. WEST, WHITTAKER & CRAWFORD, supra note 64, at 3; Ayanna Howard & Charles
Isbell, Diversity in AI: The Invisible Men and Women, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Sept. 21,
2020), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/diversity-in-ai-the-invisible-men-and-women
[https://perma.cc/P2J7-S2VN].
67. SASHA COSTANZA-CHOCK, DESIGN JUSTICE: COMMUNITY-LED PRACTICES TO
BUILD THE WORLD WE NEED 73–74 (2020).
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existing workforce.68 There is also an “endpoint” problem69—women,
Black, and Latino employees who work in this sector leave at far higher
rates than White men due to harassment, lack of mentorship, exclusion,
and disrespect.70 Catherine D’Ignazio and Lauren Klein warn of the consequences of the tech industry’s homogeneity: “When data teams are primarily composed of people from dominant groups, those perspectives
come to exert outsized influence on the decisions being made—to the
exclusion of other identities and perspectives.”71
At the second layer of bias, the choice of data used to implement the
model can result in a disparate impact because the chosen data may reflect preexisting structural biases. Pauline Kim summarizes this dynamic:
“Predictive algorithms are built by observing past patterns of behavior,
and one of the enduring patterns in American economic life is the unequal distribution of opportunities along the lines of race, gender, and
other personal characteristics.”72 The algorithms carry forward historical
biases embedded in the training data. For example, police departments
across the country use predictive software to identify high-crime areas
and likely offenders.73 Critics charge that this software merely leads police back to the same locations where high numbers of arrests were made
in the past. Given that Black communities have long been over-policed,
this creates a “self-reinforcing feedback loop”74 that “perpetuate[s] historical biases in enforcement.”75 Another example involves the Amazon
68. Maya Beasley, There Is a Supply of Diverse Workers in Tech, So Why Is Silicon
Valley So Lacking in Diversity?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 29, 2017), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2017/03/29/429424/supply-diverse-workerstech-silicon-valley-lacking-diversity [https://perma.cc/HB7Q-X4ZY].
69. Kimberly A. Houser, Can AI Solve the Diversity Problem in the Tech Industry?
Mitigating Noise and Bias in Employment Decision-Making, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 290,
297–303 (2019) (stating women leave the tech industry at a rate 45% higher than men);
Kyla Windley & Edith Pan, Diversity in Tech: The Endpoint Problem, MEDIUM: THE STARTUP (Oct. 28, 2020), https://medium.com/swlh/diversity-in-tech-the-endpoint-problem77f3265b6aab [https://perma.cc/7B8L-YQ6P].
70. COSTANZA-CHOCK, supra note 67, at 71 (“Tech companies reproduce intersectional oppression through their hiring, retention, and promotion practices; through internal
corporate culture that tolerates misogyny, racism, and sexual harassment; and through the
products they design.”).
71. CATHERINE D’IGNAZIO & LAUREN F. KLEIN, DATA FEMINISM 28 (2020). See also
Johnson, supra note 28, at 1262 (stating some causes of bias “are the result of firms’ reliance on homogenous groups of developers”).
72. Pauline T. Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, 106 VA. L. REV. 867, 869–70 (2020).
73. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L.
REV. 547, 570–71 (2017); see also Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing,
52 GA. L. REV. 109, 129–40 (2017) (discussing both place-based and people-based predictive policing tools).
74. Caroline Haskins, Academics Confirm Major Predictive Policing Algorithm Is Fundamentally Flawed, VICE (Feb. 14, 2019, 11:57 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/
xwbag4/academics-confirm-major-predictive-policingalgorithm-is-fundamentally-flawed
[https://perma.cc/9YQZ-2WEU].
75. William Isaac & Kristian Lum, Setting the Record Straight on Predictive Policing
and Race, APPEAL (Jan. 3, 2018), https://theappeal.org/setting-the-record-straight-on-predictive-policing-and-race-fe588b457ca2 [https://perma.cc/HQG9-WYF8]. See also Kristian
Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, SIGNIFICANCE 14, 18 (Oct. 2016); Sandra G.
Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2253 (2019) (“The choice to predict arrest
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hiring algorithm, discussed above.76 Because it relied on resumes of past
hires (predominantly men), it incorporated Silicon Valley’s historic employment patterns. Unfortunately, simply removing data about protected
classes, such as race and gender, would still not guarantee a fair result
because other inherently biased proxies, such as zip code and income
level, will produce substantially the same results as the characteristics
they replace.77 Bias at the second layer can also arise when the training
data sets are not adequately representative, such as with facial recognition algorithms.78 Those algorithms were developed primarily through
photographs of White men and, therefore, are far less accurate in identifying women of color.79
Bias seeps in at the third layer when people deploy it in the real world.
Users may apply an algorithm outside of its intended context or misinterpret an algorithm’s output.80 For example, algorithms designed to make
decisions about whether a criminal defendant should be released pending
trial focus on recidivism, yet they are deployed in sentencing decisions,
which should take into consideration a broader range of factors.81 One
study reviewing the use of algorithmic tools to predict child abuse or neglect in the child welfare system found that some social workers failed to
use the algorithm as intended.82 While some practitioners used the tool
properly, combining the algorithm’s recommendation with their judgment to make a decision, others ignored the tool entirely, exhibiting algorithm aversion.83 Conversely, others put undue faith in the tool, a

has profound consequences for racial equity because in most places, for nearly all crime
categories, arrest rates have been racially disparate for decades.”); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Digitizing the Carceral State, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1720 (2019) (reviewing VIRGINIA
EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND
PUNISH THE POOR (2018)).
76. See Dastin, supra note 40.
77. Eckhouse, Lum, Conti-Cook & Ciccolini, supra note 32, at 192–93 (“In a society
structured by racism and segregation, many variables commonly included in models, from
location to employment to prior police encounters, will be correlated with race.”).
78. Sara Hooker, Moving Beyond “Algorithmic Bias Is a Data Problem,” PATTERNS
1–2 (Apr. 9, 2022), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8085589/pdf/main.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UM6Y-JPGK].
79. See Lindsey Barrett, Ban Facial Recognition Technologies for Children—And for
Everyone Else, 26 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 223, 231, 247–48 (2020).
80. Danks & London, supra note 30, at 4694 (describing two forms of inappropriate
uses of algorithms: transfer context bias and interpretation bias).
81. DANIELLE KEHL, PRISCILLA GUO & SAMUEL KESSLER, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR.
FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ASSESSING THE
USE OF RISK ASSESSMENTS IN SENTENCING 13–14 (2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/
1/33746041 [https://perma.cc/9MXQ-P7BX].
82. Thea Snow, From Satisficing to Artificing: The Evolution of Administrative Decision-Making in the Age of the Algorithm, 3 DATA & POL’Y e3, 1–3 (2021), https://www.cam
bridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/8962400DADAC3C740AC023
A20B38E285/S2632324920000255a.pdf/from-satisficing-to-artificing-the-evolution-of-ad
ministrative-decision-making-in-the-age-of-the-algorithm.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YL2AZ9K].
83. Id. at 6–8, 10–12.
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psychological phenomenon known as “automation bias.”84 There are also
situations in which human decision-makers use these data-centric tools to
mask their “subjective judgments, burying them under a patina of objectivity and making them harder to monitor.”85
The base layer of bias implicates concerns about the fairness of judging
individuals based on their characteristics; these concerns are heightened
when core civil and human rights are at stake.86 As already noted, many
algorithmic models are based on “the past behavior of other people,” and
these models inevitably incorporate data regarding protected characteristics and socioeconomic variables.87 Algorithms thus turn inequality into
individualized determinations that mask the structural basis of their outputs.88 So, even when facial recognition technology eventually works out
its accuracy problems through more representative training data, the
question remains: Should this technology be used at all when it deprives
individuals of privacy, has a chilling effect on public protests and gatherings and is more likely to be deployed as a policing tool against minorities?89 This is what Frank Pasquale calls a “second wave” question about
algorithmic fairness, asking whether certain algorithmic systems should
be deployed at all, and who gets to make that decision, rather than how
to tweak and improve the algorithms.90
In light of growing evidence of algorithmic bias, the civil rights community has coalesced, along with data privacy and consumer advocacy organizations, to demand legal and policy reforms that address the problem of
digital discrimination. As a coalition of fourteen civil rights organizations
stated in 2021, “[T]he United States needs new, updated, and comprehensive laws to protect our civil rights” because existing privacy laws “do not
contain anti-discrimination protections or effective enforcement provisions.”91 Presidents Obama and Biden have highlighted the risks—and
84. Id. at 13. On automation bias more generally, see Linda J. Skitka, Kathleen L.
Mosier & Mark Burdick, Does Automation Bias Decision-Making?, 51 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUT. STUD. 991 (1999).
85. Angèle Christin, Algorithms in Practice: Comparing Web Journalism and Criminal
Justice, Jul.–Dec. 2017 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1, 10 (2017), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
pdf/10.1177/2053951717718855 [https://perma.cc/2GW5-339S].
86. See Eckhouse, Lim, Conti-Cook & Ciccolini, supra note 32, at 198.
87. Id. at 199.
88. See id.
89. See Barrett, supra note 79, at 239–251 (summarizing harms of facial recognition).
90. Frank Pasquale, The Second Wave of Algorithmic Accountability, L. & POL. ECON.
PROJECT (Nov. 25, 2019), https://lpeproject.org/blog/the-second-wave-of-algorithmic-accountability [https://perma.cc/AVE7-PN9A].
91. C.R. PRIV. & TECH. TABLE, CIVIL RIGHTS, PRIVACY, AND TECHNOLOGY: RECOMMENDED 2021 OVERSIGHT PRIORITIES FOR THE 177TH CONGRESS, 23, 32 (2021), https://
www.civilrightstable.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Civil-Rights-Privacy-and-Technology-Recommended-2021-Oversight-Priorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL9V-VGLG]. See also
Letter from The Leadership Conf. on Civ. & Hum. Rts. to Ambassador Susan Rice, Dir.
Domestic Pol’y Council (Oct. 27, 2021), https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/up
loads/2021/11/10.27.21-AI-Letter-to-Ambassador-Rice-on-Civil-Rights-and-AI.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4CNJ-D9V6] (“[T]he clock is already ticking on what can be accomplished during President Biden’s first term” with regard to a “public and proactive agenda on the civil
rights implications of AI.”).
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benefits—of AI, including civil rights violations it could cause. In 2022,
the Biden White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy released an AI Bill of Rights, including the principle that people “should
not face discrimination by algorithms and systems should be used and
designed in an equitable way.”92 While federal agencies have studied the
benefits and risks of AI for several years93 (and have even brought enforcement actions in the past),94 the effort to curtail the use and effects of
discriminatory algorithmic systems appears to have intensified in the last
few years. A number of federal agencies have announced renewed commitment to enforce the laws implicated by AI and other automated systems, including civil rights protections within their regulatory authority.95
Congress has considered but not passed legislation to enhance data privacy and algorithmic accountability, and these proposed bills typically address civil rights concerns.96 In the face of congressional intransigence,
some states have passed laws enhancing data privacy that will limit the
biometric use of personal data and digital surveillance.97 Clearly, the civil
rights implications of AI are on the public agenda. However, the current
framing of civil rights does not expressly encompass people who face digital discrimination based on their SES, even though automated systems
92. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, BLUEPRINT FOR
AI BILL OF RIGHTS: MAKING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS WORK FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/ai-bill-of-rights [https://perma.cc/C5US-AKE2]. The
antidiscrimination principle is linked to existing legal protections, so does not address
socio-economic discrimination.
93. See, e.g., NAT’L SEC. COMM’N ON A.I., FINAL REPORT 15 (2021), https://
www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N7H8-MBZJ] (presenting the Commission’s findings of a study that began in the spring of
2019); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-142SP, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT:
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS
(2018); National Artificial Intelligence Initiative: Overseeing and Implementing the United
States National AI Strategy, NAT’L A.I. INITIATIVE, https://www.ai.gov [https://perma.cc/
W6XN-PHEW].
94. See, e.g., Charge of Discrimination, Sec’y Dep’t Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Facebook,
Inc., FHEO No. 01-18-0323-8 (March 28, 2019) (charging Facebook with housing discrimination in its ad delivery system); Lesley Fair, $3 Million FCRA Settlement Puts Tenant
Background Screening at the Forefront, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2018/10/3-million-fcra-settlement-puts-tenantbackground-screening-forefront [https://perma.cc/VN6X-BUBV] (settling charges that tenant screening company failed to ensure accuracy of its reports).
95. See, e.g., Andrew Smith, Using Artificial Intelligence and Algorithms, FED. TRADE
COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/
2020/04/using-artificial-intelligence-algorithms [https://perma.cc/MJ7M-7ECV]; Elisa Jillson, Aiming for Truth, Fairness, and Equity in Your Company’s Use of AI, FED. TRADE
COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/
2021/04/aiming-truth-fairness-equity-your-companys-use-ai [https://perma.cc/US8UX3LC]; Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Launches Initiative on Artificial Intelligence and Algorithmic Fairness (Oct. 28, 2021), https://
www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-launches-initiative-artificial-intelligence-and-algorithmicfairness [https://perma.cc/ES6F-R5NE]; Written Testimony of Director Rohit Chopra
Before the House Committee on Financial Services, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct.
28, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/written-testimony-director-rohit-chopra-before-house-committee-financial-services [https://perma.cc/92SV-ZC75].
96. See infra Part III.C.
97. Id.
AN
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have outsized and harmful impacts on people experiencing poverty, as
the following Section clarifies.
B. DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE EXPERIENCING
POVERTY
People experiencing poverty have long faced stigma and discrimination
in the United States.98 The prevailing explanation for poverty in the
United States is that people are poor due to behavioral choices.99 In this
“culture of poverty” perspective, the poor make deficient choices that
trap them in poverty.100 This theory aligns with the American myth of
meritocracy, which holds that anyone can pull themselves up by their
bootstraps with hard work and determination.101 This myth implies that
failure to thrive in a capitalist economy is tied to moral failure.102 However, the reality of poverty has multiple, overlapping structural causes
tied to the nature of our economy, including the increase of low-wage
jobs; declining power of unions; lack of universal childcare, health care,
and affordable housing; inadequate educational opportunities; limited social supports; growing income inequality; and discrimination—in sum, “a
failure of the economic and political structures to provide enough decent
opportunities and supports for the whole of society.”103
Given the dominant ideology, it is unsurprising that anti-poverty discrimination in the analog world is replicated in the digital world. This
Section provides four case studies that demonstrate how data-centric
technologies adversely impact low-income people. It explores algorithms
used in tenant screening, credit scoring, higher education, and targeted
advertising. These case studies are far from comprehensive,104 but they
98. See Peterman, supra note 7, at 1303–12. See also Mario L. Barnes & Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence,
72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 121 (2009) (“Poverty certainly shares many of the characteristics that warrant heightened scrutiny for race. There has been a long history of discrimination against the poor, often in ways that are invisible to those with resources.”).
99. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 11, at 70; Jennings, supra note 11, at
18–19 (summarizing behavioral theories); Munger, supra note 11, at 3 (“More strictly than
other industrialized societies, we measure the worthiness of all our citizens by the level of
their commitment to the labor market . . . .”).
100. Oscar Lewis first articulated this theory in social science scholarship, concluding
that poor people develop their own value system, which perpetuates itself over generations
and is nearly impossible to escape, even if structural conditions change. Oscar Lewis, The
Culture of Poverty, 35 SOC’Y 7, 7 (Jan/Feb 1998). The people in this culture share a “strong
feeling of marginality, of helplessness, of dependency, of not belonging . . . . Along with
this feeling of powerlessness is a widespread feeling of inferiority, of personal unworthiness.” Id.
101. See generally STEPHEN J. MCNAMEE & ROBERT K. MILLER, JR., THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 1–2 (2d ed. 2009); Mark R. Rank, Toward a New Understanding of American Poverty, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 25 (2006).
102. Cf. GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 68 (1981) (“The only dependable
route from poverty is always work, family, and faith . . . . But the current poor . . . are
refusing to work hard.”).
103. Mark R. Rank, Rethinking American Poverty, Spring 2011 CONTEXTS 16, 19
(2011).
104. For a comprehensive catalogue of algorithmic harms suffered by low-income people, see GILMAN, supra note 3.
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illustrate how the digital economy reflects and reinforces poverty.
1. Tenant Screening Algorithms
Across the United States, low-income people struggle to find affordable and habitable housing. Indeed, 70% of extremely low-income renters
spend more than half their income on rent and utilities, leaving little income left over to meet basic needs.105 There is no county in America
where a person earning minimum wage and working forty hours per week
can afford a two-bedroom home.106 Further, post-pandemic rental markets for low-income Americans are competitive, and rents are rising
faster than wages.107 Meanwhile, three out of four eligible households do
not obtain any federally subsidized housing assistance.108 Based on the
number of low-income renter households, the market is short 3.4 million
rental homes in the low-income price range.109 The unaffordability crisis
disproportionately impacts low-income people of color due to income inequality, discrimination in homeownership opportunities, and a large racial wealth gap.110 Algorithmically generated tenant screening reports
pose an additional barrier for many low-income renters.
Ninety percent of landlords purchase tenant screening reports from
over 2,000 companies that algorithmically score potential tenants based
on various attributes, such as residential history, civil and criminal case
history, credit history, and ill-defined “lifestyle” criteria like marital history and pet ownership.111 These companies obtain this information from
data brokers and public records.112 Reports typically generate a tenant105. ANDREW AURAND, DAN EMMANUEL, DANIEL THREET, IKRA RAFI & DIANE
YENTEL, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE
HOMES 2 (2021), https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24FD-9BD4].
106. ANDREW AURAND, DAN EMMANUEL, DANIEL THREET, IKRA RAFI & DIANE
YENTEL, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH: THE HIGH COST OF HOUSING 4 (2021), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/2021/Out-of-Reach_2021.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V5GS-4VWD].
107. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING 2022 23–24
(2022), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_Ameri
cas_Rental_Housing_2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW5X-D7BJ]; AURAND ET AL., supra
note 105, at 3–4. Thirty-six percent of renter households earn less than $30,000 per year;
only fifteen percent of homeowner households earn under this threshold. JOINT CTR. FOR
HOUS. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 107, at 13.
108. AURAND ET AL., supra note 105, at 3.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 7.
111. Shivangi Bhatia, To “Otherwise Make Unavailable”: Tenant Screening Companies’
Liability Under the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Theory, 88 FORDHAM L. REV.
2551, 2553, 2260 (2020); Lauren Kirchner & Matthew Goldstein, Access Denied: Faulty
Automated Background Checks Freeze Out Renters, MARKUP (May 28, 2020, 5:00 PM),
https://themarkup.org/locked-out/2020/05/28/access-denied-faulty-automated-backgroundchecks-freeze-out-renters [https://perma.cc/4GDM-NQV5].
112. ARIEL NELSON., NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., BROKEN RECORDS REDUX: HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK COMPANIES CONTINUE TO HARM CONSUMERS
SEEKING JOBS AND HOUSING 10 (2019), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/criminal-justice/
report-broken-records-redux.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ9U-CPA4] (“It is often purchased in
bulk from public sources—including law enforcement agencies, state courts, corrections
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worthiness number (similar to a credit score) or provide a landlord with a
thumbs-up or thumbs-down recommendation.113 Tenant screening reports have been called “tenant blacklists”114 or a “Scarlet E,”115 limiting
where—and whether—people are housed.
Tenant screening reports are problematic for several reasons. To begin,
they are misleading because they lack context. Reports may include eviction court filings, but they do not necessarily include whether the tenant
won or raised meritorious defenses, or if the case was dismissed.116 The
reports can also be rife with inaccuracies.117 A frequent error involves
cross-matched data regarding people with similar names, which disproportionately impacts minorities.118 Countless tenants have been denied
housing based on the criminal records of another person with the same or
similar name.119
Yet even if mistakes were fixed and context provided in these reports,
the adverse impacts on poor people would remain because of certain data
points included in tenant screening algorithms. As mentioned above, algorithms factor in prior eviction filings, which live forever in digital reports.120 Approximately 2.3 million low-income renters are evicted every
year, largely due to nonpayment of rent,121 which reflects rising rents and
stagnant wages.122 Sociologist Matthew Desmond claims, “Eviction is a
offices, and criminal record repositories—or obtained from public websites via web scraping technology.” (citations omitted)).
113. Kaveh Waddell, How Tenant Screening Reports Make It Hard for People to
Bounce Back from Tough Times, CONSUMER REPS. (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.consumer
reports.org/algorithmic-bias/tenant-screening-reports-make-it-hard-to-bounce-back-fromtough-times [https://perma.cc/Q67C-ABRV].
114. Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to
Protect Public Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344, 1381 (2007).
115. Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Erasing the “Scarlet E” of Eviction Records, APPEAL (Apr.
12, 2021), https://theappeal.org/the-lab/report/erasing-the-scarlet-e-of-eviction-records
[https://perma.cc/XA7B-ZBPN].
116. See id. (“[T]enants can get marked as undesirable simply because the data collection method used by most tenant-screening bureaus includes anyone named as a defendant
in an eviction case, regardless of whether any judgment is issued against them.”); Kleysteuber, supra note 114, at 1355.
117. Kirchner & Goldstein, supra note 111; Cyrus Farivar, Tenant Screening Software
Faces National Reckoning, NBC (March 14, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
tech/tech-news/tenant-screening-software-faces-national-reckoning-n1260975 [https://
perma.cc/XW4T-S2ET].
118. Kirchner & Goldstein, supra note 111. Cross-matching errors particularly impact
minority groups “which tend to have fewer unique last names. For example, more than 12
million Latinos nationwide share just 26 surnames, according to the census.” Id.
119. See id.
120. Sabbeth, supra note 115.
121. See David Brancaccio & Katie Long, Millions of Americans are Evicted Every
Year—and Not Just in Big Cities, MARKETPLACE (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.market
place.org/2018/04/09/eviction-desmond-princeton-housing-crisis-rent [https://perma.cc/
22Z8-33BC] (noting that the one million evictions impacts 2.3 million people, many of
whom are children); National Estimates: Eviction in America, EVICTION LAB (May 11,
2018), https://evictionlab.org/national-estimates [https://perma.cc/LZJ2-FLUS] (“[W]e see
almost a million evictions against tenants every single year.”).
122. See Pamela Foohey & Sara S. Greene, Credit Scoring Duality, 86 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming 2022).
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cause, not just a condition, of poverty.”123 Eviction records are permanent data points in tenant screening reports, limiting people’s economic
and geographic mobility.124
Credit checks are also folded into tenant screening reports. This is
problematic for the 11% of American adults, or 26 million people, who
are “credit invisible,” meaning they have no credit history whatsoever.125
An additional 8.3%, or 19.5 million people, have credit considered “unscorable,” meaning they lack sufficient credit histories to generate a
score.126 Credit invisible and unscorable people are concentrated in lowincome neighborhoods and among Black and Latino Americans.127 And
even with credit, people living in low-income neighborhoods are more
likely to have low credit scores.128 Credit scoring is also notoriously rife
with errors, particularly for people living in Black and Latino neighborhoods.129 Accordingly, using credit scores as data points in tenant screening reports disproportionately harms low-income people.
Further, tenant screening reports include criminal background checks,
yet another factor that disadvantages low-income tenants and particularly
people of color. One in three Americans has a criminal record, yet many
are for arrests that never resulted in a conviction.130 Criminal records are
inextricably tied to poverty—poor people are disproportionately involved
with the criminal legal system.131 Poor adults are four times more likely
to be incarcerated in state prisons than adults above the poverty line.132
123. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
299 (2016).
124. See id. at 297–98.
125. KENNETH P. BREVOORT, PHILIPP GRIMM & MICHELLE KAMBARA, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, DATA POINT: CREDIT INVISIBLES 4–6 (2015), https://files.consumer
finance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y35T-VQHQ].
126. Id.
127. See id. at 6. In low-income neighborhoods, almost 45% of adults are credit invisible or credit unscorable, as compared to 9% in high-income neighborhoods. See id. See
also Foohey & Greene, supra note 122, at 3.
128. Foohey & Greene, supra note 122, at 9.
129. See id. at 8–9; CFPB Finds Credit Report Disputes Far More Common in Majority
Black and Hispanic Neighborhoods, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Nov. 2, 2021), https:/
/www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-finds-credit-report-disputes-farmore-common-in-majority-black-and-hispanic-neighborhoods [https://perma.cc/VX5VW5HY].
130. See REBECCA VALLAS, SHARON DIETRICH & BETH AVERY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS A CRIMINAL RECORD SHOULDN’T BE A LIFE SENTENCE TO POVERTY 21 (May
2021), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/criminal-record-shouldnt-life-sentencepoverty-2 [https://perma.cc/VA74-XH6S]; Matthew Friedman, Just Facts: As Many Americans Have Criminal Records as College Diplomas, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 17,
2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/just-facts-many-ameri
cans-have-criminal-records-college-diplomas [https://perma.cc/7XCH-2BEQ].
131. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Class Matters, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31, 55
(2011); Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J.
2176, 2178 (2013). Butler points out that incarceration is also tightly linked to unemployment and low levels of education, which are additional indicators of the “correlation between poverty and incarceration.” Id. at 2181–82.
132. Hashimoto, supra note 131, at 57. In addition, individuals whose income is less
than 150% of the federal poverty line are fifteen times more likely to be charged with a
felony than “those above the 150% marker.” Id. at 61.
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Moreover, thousands of people are charged with crimes directly related
to poverty, such as crimes related to homelessness (e.g., loitering, public
camping, and sleeping in public),133 failure to pay child support, and nonpayment of fines and fees imposed by the criminal legal system. Poor people are one of the most represented groups in the criminal legal system,
along with drug-dependent and mentally ill defendants.134 In turn, criminal records perpetuate poverty through their collateral consequences that
formally or informally bar people from housing, jobs, public benefits, and
other opportunities.135
Criminal background checks are racially and socioeconomically discriminatory.136 As Sarah Esther Lageson explains, using criminal records
to assess a person’s trustworthiness or value “legitimizes police decisionmaking and entrenches the criminal justice system across unrelated institutions.”137 Nevertheless, there is no evidence that criminal records accurately predict a person’s ability to retain housing or comply with a
lease.138 Indeed, there is little empirical evidence regarding any data fed
into tenant screening algorithms,139 yet landlords heavily rely on them.
An algorithmic system built on hunches rather than science continues to
reflect and perpetuate poverty.
2. Financial Markets and Consumer Reporting
Due to their “quantified identities,”140 poor people are targeted for
subprime and predatory financial products while being excluded from
mainstream financial opportunities. As with housing, this financial
133. Michael Stamm, Between a Rock and Discriminatory Place: How Sentencing
Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums Should Be Employed to Reduce Poverty Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 399, 402–04 (2017).
134. Hashimoto, supra note 131, at 62 (“African Americans were approximately three
times more likely to be prisoners than non-African Americans. While that ratio is high, the
overrepresentation of poor people is even higher, with poor people being more than four
times more likely to be in state prison than non-poor people.”).
135. See Sarah Esther Lageson, How Criminal Background Checks Lead to Discrimination Against Millions of Americans, WASH. POST (July 10, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/2020/07/10/personal-data-industry-is-complicit-bad-policing-it-must-beheld-accountable [https://perma.cc/SC8F-JAWQ].
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Valerie Schneider, Racism Knocking at the Door: The Use of Criminal Background
Checks in Rental Housing, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 923, 933 (2019); Rebecca J. Walter, Jill
Viglione & Marie Skubak Tillyer, One Strike to Second Chances: Using Criminal Backgrounds in Admission Decisions for Assisted Housing, 27 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 1, 6 (2017).
139. Walter, Viglione & Skubak Tillyer, supra note 138, at 7 (“Surprisingly, in the housing field, there is little research examining factors that predict a successful tenant . . . . [N]othing suggests that a criminal background implies the individual will be a bad
tenant.”). See also Kimani Paul-Emile, Reconsidering Criminal Background Checks: Race,
Gender, and Redemption, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 395, 397 (2016) (“Studies have cast
doubt on the assumption that the existence of a criminal record correctly forecasts one’s
work behavior, and data show that individuals with criminal records who stay clean for a
few years are no more likely than anyone else to have a future arrest.”).
140. Frank A. Pasquale & Danielle Keats Citron, Promoting Innovation While Preventing Discrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1413, 1414
(2014).
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marginalization based on sorting and segmenting consumers reflects and
reinforces poverty. Digital profiling makes the economically vulnerable
ripe for online targeting by high-interest lenders, including bank and
fintech partnerships that are moving aggressively into the fringe banking
space.141 Online lead generation steers low-income (predominantly
Black) consumers to high-interest payday loans and other predatory
products.142 The lead generation industry scrapes individuals’ online interactions to generate profiles and then sells them to companies that barrage users with predatory offers.143 One lead generator brags that it
provides payday loan companies with highly segmented lists that identify
“consumers who are struggling to make their bills and are looking for fast
quick cash.”144
Payday lenders began as storefront operations disproportionately located in Black and Hispanic communities.145 Now, they invest heavily in
an online presence to target the same minority groups, in part because
some states have outlawed payday lending.146 Yet online advertisements
reach consumers even in states where payday lending is unlawful. The
average annual percentage rate (APR) for online payday loans is
650%.147 Due to these high-interest rates, borrowers struggle to pay back
loans, and “80[%] of payday loans are taken out within two weeks of
repayment of a previous payday loan,”148 resulting in a debt spiral and

141. See Pamela Foohey & Nathalie Martin, Fintech’s Role in Exacerbating or Reducing
the Wealth Gap, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 459, 482–84, 487 (2021); Cassandra Jones Havard,
Democratizing Credit: Examining the Structural Inequities of Subprime Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 233, 247 (2006).
142. See Alvaro Bedoya & Clare Garvie, Comments on “Follow the Lead: An FTC
Workshop on Lead Generation,” (Dec. 18, 2015). “[L]ead generators, an integral component of the online payday lending industry, purposefully target African American and
other minority borrowers in advertising.” Id. at 2.
143. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, “FOLLOW THE LEAD” WORKSHOP: STAFF PERSPECTIVE
4 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/staff-perspective-follow-lead/
staff_perspective_follow_the_lead_workshop.pdf [https://perma.cc/5M8X-Z8KN] (describing how the industry operates); AARON RIEKE AND LOGAN KOEPKE, UPTURN, LED
ASTRAY: ONLINE LEAD GENERATION AND PAYDAY LOANS 1–6 (2015), https://www.up
turn.org/static/reports/2015/led-astray/files/Upturn_-_Led_Astray_v.1.01.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/WZU2-4SRE].
144. Bedoya & Garvie, supra note 142, at 4 (quoting a lead generator).
145. See Robin A. Prager, Determinants of the Locations of Payday Lenders, Pawnshops and Check-Cashing Outlets 3 (Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Working Paper No. 2009-33, 2009),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200933/200933pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GM54-N7L7].
146. See Kristin Johnson, Frank Pasquale & Jennifer Chapman, Artificial Intelligence,
Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance: Toward Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 499, 517–18 (2019).
147. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., FRAUD AND ABUSE ONLINE: HARMFUL PRACTICES
IN INTERNET PAYDAY LENDING 2 (2014), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2014/10/
payday-lending-report/fraud_and_abuse_online_harmful_practices_in_internet_payday_
lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8ZB-MDWE].
148. Payday Loan Facts and the CFPB’s Impact, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Jan. 14,
2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2016/01/payday-loanfacts-and-the-cfpbs-impact [https://perma.cc/68E8-LPBT].
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poverty trap.149 Due to regulatory and consumer pressure, Facebook and
Google imposed bans on payday lending advertisements, but predatory
companies consistently evade the bans by manipulating their web pages
and partnering with banks located in states with no interest rate limits.150
Anyone searching online for available credit can expect to be bombarded
with pop-up ads, ads on social media, emails, text messages, and other
sales pitches from web-based lenders that evade state usury
restrictions.151
Payday lending is just the tip of the iceberg. The entire consumer reporting industry sells low-income consumers’ data to companies eager to
target them. These companies collect and provide information to payday
lenders, rent-to-own businesses, furniture stores that offer financing,
high-risk consumer finance businesses, subprime home-lending businesses, and debt purchasers.152 The data broker industry sorts consumers
into micro-categories for sale, such as low-income minority communities
(e.g., “Urban Scramble” and “Mobile Mixers”); the elderly poor (e.g.,
“Rural Everlasting” and “Thrifty Elders”); and financially precarious
consumers (e.g., “Underbanked Indicator” and “Pennywise Mortgagees”).153 Consumer exploitation is “made possible when a disadvantaged group is deemed risky and forced to pay a social price.”154
Low-income people’s credit scores not only bar them from mainstream
financial markets but also deprive them of opportunities that rely on
creditworthiness, including housing, employment, insurance, and higher
education.155 “[A] fair or poor credit score can trap people in a cycle of
paying more for credit and utilities, losing out on job opportunities, being
denied housing and insurance, being unable to build any savings for
149. See Andrea Freeman, Payback: A Structural Analysis of the Credit Card Problem,
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 151, 154 (2013) (“A debt spiral occurs when a person borrows a small
amount but all of her payments go towards interest and fees, never diminishing the principal. A poverty trap is when a household or individual lives below a threshold . . . where it is
possible to accumulate enough assets to escape poverty through saving.”).
150. Coulter Jones, Jean Eaglesham & AnnaMaria Andriotis, How Payday Lenders
Target Consumers Hurt by Coronavirus, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2020, 8:23 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/how-payday-lenders-target-consumers-hurt-by-coronavirus-11591176
601?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/M7U9-FMV5]; Here & Now, High Interest Payday Loan Lenders Target Vulnerable Communities During COVID-19, WBUR (June 5,
2020), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2020/06/05/payday-loans-coronavirus [https://
perma.cc/4PV8-ADP9].
151. Jones, Eaglesham & Andriotis, supra note 150; Johnson, Pasquale & Chapman,
supra note 146, at 502–03.
152. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU supra note 18, at 31–33.
153. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 19–20 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-bro
kers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527
databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX2Z-D4EL].
154. Matthew Desmond & Nathan Wilmers, Do the Poor Pay More for Housing? Exploitation, Profit, and Risk in Rental Markets, 124 AM. J. SOCIO. 1090, 1117 (2019).
155. See Foohey & Greene, supra note 122, at 7, 11. Half of U.S. employers look at
applicants credit reports, “even though there is little evidence that credit history predicts
workplace outcomes.” Rourke L. O’Brien & Barbara Kiviat, Disparate Impact? Race, Sex,
and Credit Reports in Hiring, 4 SOCIUS: SOCIO. RSCH. FOR DYNAMIC WORLD 1, 1 (2018).
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emergencies, and possibly facing homelessness.”156 Frank Pasquale and
Danielle Citron explain, “Scores can become self-fulfilling prophecies,
creating the financial distress they claim merely to indicate.”157 A low
score can depress economic mobility, and certain groups within society
have predictably lower scores. Often, “[a] good credit score is usually a
proxy for wealth, and wealth is a good proxy for race and national origin.”158 Poor people and minorities have lower credit scores and higher
rates of credit invisibility due to legacies of discrimination and
segregation.159
Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy directly link credit scoring’s “systematic measurement and exploitation of social differences” to class,
which they defined as the “social distribution of life chances in markets.”160 Market segmentation allows lenders to tailor their products to
specific populations. Class experiences along the social continuum vary,
but “markets see social differences very well, and thrive on them.”161 In
the bottom quintile, market segmentation excludes borrowers deemed
high risk from mainstream banking; at the same time, the American welfare state relies on access to credit as a substitute for a robust safety
net.162 Low-income people are the biggest sources of profits for credit
card companies,163 and for those who cannot get a credit card, fringe
banking proliferates. This group contains “a stubborn stratum of unscorable, unscored, and underscored individuals—a Lumpen-scoretariat
composed mostly of poor people.”164
Despite multiple industries’ reliance on credit scores, there is little evidence that they are accurate indicators of the ability to repay loans, pay
rent, or succeed in the workplace.165 Rather, “[p]recarious work and
housing situations, an inability to fall back on family for financial help,
and barriers to building savings all show up in credit scores—and have
much more to do with economic-social structures than people’s trustworthiness.”166 Given the baked-in discrimination in credit scoring models
156. Foohey & Greene, supra note 122, at 2.
157. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 18.
158. Vlad A. Hertza, Fighting Unfair Classifications in Credit Reporting: Should the
United States Adopt GDPR-Inspired Rights in Regulating Consumer Credit?, 93 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1707, 1727 (2018).
159. See Foohey & Greene, supra note 122, at 9–10 (“America’s history of segregation
and discrimination in lending—which denied Black Americans loans to start small businesses and purchase homes, and steered minorities to high-interest and otherwise unfavorable loans—continues to show up in credit scoring.”).
160. Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Classification Situations: Life-chances in the Neoliberal Era, 38 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y. 559, 566, 569 (2013).
161. Id. at 562.
162. See id. at 565.
163. Andrea Freeman explains that the greatest source of profits for credit card companies are low-income consumers on the verge of bankruptcy. Freeman, supra note 149, at
153. She states that this “represents a massive redistribution of wealth from the poor to
wealthier consumers and corporations.” Id. at 154.
164. Fourcade & Healy, supra note 160, at 565.
165. See Foohey & Greene, supra note 122, at 3.
166. Id. at 9.
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and the problem of credit invisibility, some financial entities are developing alternate scoring models.167 They promise to assist low-income people
and minorities by folding in new forms of data, such as timely utility and
rental payments and social media data, rather than relying on traditional
data points that magnify existing disparities.168 Still, there are concerns
that alternative data points might “be designed to identify and target vulnerable individuals with high-cost loan products.”169 Without careful design and oversight, both traditional and alternative credit rating models
raise the risk that affordable credit will remain out of reach for low-income consumers.170 In the interim, credit reporting will continue to be a
gatekeeper, withholding fair access to life’s necessities.
3. Algorithms in Higher Education
A college degree can be a pathway out of poverty. College-educated
workers have higher rates of employment and income than workers with
lower levels of education.171 On average, college graduates earn 84%
more than nongraduates.172 Poor children who do not earn a college degree are four times as likely to remain poor than those who graduate.173
For people who grow up below the poverty line, the return on a four-year
degree is 179% for lifetime earnings.174 Accordingly, “[i]ncreased college
degree attainment would meaningfully raise economic security for individuals near the bottom of the earnings distribution and reduce poverty
rates.”175 Unfortunately, children from low-income families face numerous barriers to attending college, including lower-quality high schools,
lack of support for navigating the college admissions process, and tuition
costs. As a result, less than 50% of children from the lowest quintile of
households attend college, compared to 92% of children growing up in
167. See id. at 4, 11–14.
168. See Karan Kaul, Adopting Alternative Data in Credit Scoring Would Allow Millions of Consumers to Access Credit, URB. INST. (March 15, 2021), https://www.urban.org/
urban-wire/adopting-alternative-data-credit-scoring-would-allow-millions-consumers-access-credit [https://perma.cc/SKV9-9AMB].
169. Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring & Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 148, 167 (2016); Foohey & Greene, supra note 122, at 20.
170. Foohey & Greene, supra note 122, at 22–23.
171. Brad J. Hershbein, Melissa S. Kearney & Luke W. Pardue, College Attainment,
Income Inequality, and Economic Security: A Simulation Exercise 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch. Working Paper No. 26747, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/
w26747/w26747.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AVF-FMV6].
172. ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE, STEPHEN J. ROSE & BAN CHEAH, GEORGETOWN UNIV.
CTR. ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, THE COLLEGE PAYOFF: EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONS,
LIFETIME EARNINGS 1 (2011), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/
2011/collegepayoff.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ETA-7G7Q].
173. Andrew P. Kelly, Does College Really Improve Social Mobility?, BROOKINGS (Feb.
11, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2014/02/11/does-collegereally-improve-social-mobility [https://perma.cc/6HYE-ATUS].
174. Tim Bartik & Brad Hershbein, College Does Help the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (May 23,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/23/opinion/college-does-help-the-poor.html
[https://perma.cc/7FQY-V8RR].
175. Hershbein, Kearney & Pardue, supra note 171 at 1.
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the top quintile.176 Algorithmic college admissions systems threaten to
reinforce and even exacerbate these patterns.
Nonprofit colleges increasingly rely on algorithms to predict which prospective students are likely to enroll and determine the precise level of
financial aid an admitted student’s enrollment will bring.177 In an era of
declining state support for higher education, accompanied by a demographic dip in the college-age population, colleges are under pressure to
remain financially stable; enrollment management algorithms promise to
help colleges attain financial stability by offering to help plan and budget
with greater precision.178 To recruit and select students, colleges deploy
algorithms that gather and aggregate data such as names purchased from
testing companies, test scores, zip codes, academic interests, household
income, ethnic and racial information, and student interactions with college websites and social media accounts.179 Schools use this data to award
students a score from 1–100, which drives the level of attention colleges
pay to students in the recruiting process.180 These algorithms can harm
prospective students in several ways. First, they generally reduce scholarship funding that colleges offer prospective students, thus pushing students to assume larger debt loads, which raises rates of non-graduation,
particularly for racial minorities.181 Further, the focus on yield distracts
from the goal of “optimizing . . . student success, retention, or graduation.”182 Seeking to increase revenue, colleges may also favor students
whose families can pay full tuition.183
176. Sarah Reber, Chenoah Sinclair & Hannah Van Drie, Public Colleges Are the
Workhorses of Middle-Class Mobility, BROOKINGS (July 22, 2020), https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/22/public-colleges-are-the-workhorses-of-middle-class-mobility [https://perma.cc/UKW7-QXA6].
177. Alex Engler, Enrollment Algorithms Are Contributing to the Crises of Higher Education, BROOKINGS (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/enrollment-algorithms-are-contributing-to-the-crises-of-higher-education [https://perma.cc/ER8B-8KRJ].
In 2015, 75% of colleges and universities reported using analytics for enrollment management. Id.
178. See id.
179. See Josh Moody, Algorithms for College Admissions: What to Know, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/
how-admissions-algorithms-could-affect-your-college-acceptance [https://perma.cc/N36CEXC7]; Rashida Richardson & Marci Lerner Miller, The Higher Education Industry Is
Embracing Predatory and Discriminatory Student Data Practices, SLATE (Jan. 13, 2021, 8:30
AM), https://slate.com/technology/2021/01/higher-education-algorithms-student-data-discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/LH8L-U7EZ]; Douglas MacMillan & Nick Anderson,
Student Tracking, Secret Scores: How College Admissions Offices Rank Prospects Before
They Apply, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/
10/14/colleges-quietly-rank-prospective-students-based-their-personal-data [https://
perma.cc/HDF7-UTF8].
180. See MacMillan & Anderson, supra note 179.
181. See Engler, supra note 177.
182. Id.
183. See MacMillan & Anderson, supra note 179; DJ Pangburn, Schools Are Using
Software to Help Pick Who Gets in. What Could Go Wrong?, FAST CO. (May 17, 2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90342596/schools-are-quietly-turning-to-ai-to-help-pickwho-gets-in-what-could-go-wrong [https://perma.cc/DZT7-CDL7].
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To the degree algorithms are making predictions based on historical
data, they may embed existing biases in college admissions against lowincome and minority students.184 The algorithms may “learn” that white
and wealthy students are correlated with higher graduation rates or other
metrics of “success.” How different populations engage with college websites may also create biases. For example, students with vision impairments or other disabilities may struggle to access college web pages and
thus look less interested in a school that tracks demonstrated interest.185
By contrast, affluent students may benefit from having the resources to
visit campus and receive college counseling advice to click on college
websites and emails regularly.186 As with most algorithmic systems, these
college admission algorithms are not transparent, and it is hard to know
exactly how they gauge student yield rates or student success. Thus, “the
complexity of the algorithmic process, the many potential entry points for
bias, and the separation between vendor-developed algorithms and college employees all contribute to the potential for discriminatory
outcomes.”187
The for-profit wing of the higher education industry poses a different
set of disadvantages for low-income students who assume crippling debt
with few job prospects and low graduation rates.188 Whereas algorithms
in the nonprofit higher education sector favor the wealthy, those in the
for-profit sector seek to “find inequality and feast on it.”189 A United
States Senate committee investigation found that colleges were targeting
the most vulnerable populations; for instance, one chain told its recruiters
to focus on students who were in the categories of “Welfare Mom w/
Kids,” “Pregnant Ladies,” “Recent Incarceration,” and “Drug Rehabili184. See Rebecca Koenig, As Colleges Move Away from the SAT, Will Admissions Algorithms Step In?, EDSURGE (July 10, 2020), https://www.edsurge.com/news/2020-07-10-ascolleges-move-away-from-the-sat-will-admissions-algorithms-step-in [https://perma.cc/
Y7K5-VPK7].
185. See Engler, supra note 177.
186. See Richardson & Miller, supra note 179.
187. Engler, supra note 177. Other algorithmic systems of concern in the college setting
are those used to identify which current students are high-risk and those used for exam
proctoring—both have the potential to harm marginalized students. See Shea Swauger, The
Next Normal: Algorithms Will Take Over College, From Admissions to Advising, WASH.
POST (Nov. 12, 2021, 9:07 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/next-normal-algorithms-college/2021/11/12/366fe8dc-4264-11ec-a3aa-0255edc02eb7_story.html [https://
perma.cc/9NMG-WYZT].
188. See Dundon, supra note 15, at 376–77; Genevieve Bonadies, Joshua Rovenger,
Eileen Connor, Brenda Shum, & Toby Merrill, For-Profit Schools’ Predatory Practices and
Students of Color: A Mission to Enroll Rather than Educate, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (July 30,
2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/for-profit-schools-predatory-practices-and-students-of-color-a-mission-to-enroll-rather-than-educate [https://perma.cc/5LLX-FV6Q];
Luis Armona, Rajashri Chakrarbati & Michael F. Lovenheim, Student Debt and Default:
The Role of For-Profit Colleges 32–33 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Working Paper No. 811,
2021), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/
sr811.pdf?la=EN [https://perma.cc/U9QD-XWCP].
189. O’NEIL, supra note 16, at 70. Almost one million students were enrolled in forprofit colleges in 2018. Armona, Chakrarbati & Lovenheim, supra note 188, at 1.
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tation.”190 Likewise, a lawsuit against the Corinthian College alleged that
the school was targeting students who were “isolated,” had “low self esteem,” lacked “people in their lives who care about them,” and were
“stuck” and “unable to see and plan well for the future.”191 For-profit
colleges rely heavily on algorithms to identify these vulnerable people.
Algorithmic tools include targeted advertising on platforms such as
Google and Facebook, as well as lead generation.192 Consumers who
search online for terms related to education, welfare, or employment are
tagged by web browser cookies that track consumers’ online activities,
thereby allowing for-profit colleges to communicate with consumers
across the internet with targeted ads.193 Consumers are shown fake ads
promising jobs or public benefits to harvest the consumers’ cell phone
numbers.194 In addition, when consumers fill out online forms posted by
lead generators, their information is combined with other personal data
to generate a score assessing their desirability as targets.195 A Government Accountability Office investigation found that, within five minutes
of entering the name and phone number of a potential “student” into a
single lead-generation site, the student received a recruiting call, followed
by over 180 additional calls within a single month.196
This targeting is effective and has consequences that compound poverty. One study found that 76% of students who pay their own way at forprofit colleges were poor or near poor.197 Only 26% of the students who
enrolled in for-profit colleges in 2014 graduated within six years, as compared to over 60% at public and private nonprofit schools.198 Even for
those students who graduate, for-profit degrees “modestly increase the
likelihood of employment, but appear to do little to raise earnings.”199
190. See S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LAB. & PENSIONS, 112TH CONG., FOR PROFIT
HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT & ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 766 (Comm. Print 2012).
191. O’NEIL, supra note 16, at 71.
192. See Sam Gilman, Proliferating Predation: Reverse Redlining, the Digital Proliferation of Inferior Social Welfare Products, and How to Stop It, 56 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV.
169, 196–200 (2021) [hereinafter Proliferating Predation] (“Online lead generators are
third-party data brokers that collect contact data for prospective students . . . or market
themselves as college comparison tools to unsuspecting consumers.”). See also ALYCE MYATT, U.S. PUB. INT. RSCH. GRP. & CTR. FOR DIGIT. DEMOCRACY, PRIVATE FOR-PROFIT
COLLEGES AND ONLINE LEAD GENERATION: PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES USE DIGITAL MARKETING TO TARGET PROSPECTS, INCLUDING VETERANS VIA THE INTERNET 1 (2015), https:/
/www.democraticmedia.org/sites/default/files/field/public-files/2015/forprofitcollegeleadgenreport_may2015_uspirgef_cdd_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BPU-HD55].
193. See MYATT, supra note 192, at 2.
194. See id. at 1–2.
195. See id.
196. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 15 (2010).
197. Proliferating Predation, supra note 192, at 196.
198. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stats., Fast Facts: Graduation Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=40 [https://perma.cc/ARU7-9GBG].
199. Stephanie Riegg Cellini & Nicholas Turner, Gainfully Employed? Assessing the
Employment and Earnings of For-Profit College Students Using Administrative Data 23–25
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22287, 2018), https://www.nber.org/sys-
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Thirty-two percent of the students who enroll in four-year for-profit programs and 40% of those who enroll in two-year for-profit programs default on their loans within five years of entering repayment,200 and there
is no statute of limitations on collecting federal student debt. In 2017, the
Attorney General of California investigated one chain of for-profit
schools for a range of abuses from enrollment to graduation.201 The university was charged with lying to students about job prospects, employing
aggressive admissions counselors forced to meet rigid enrollment targets,
saddling students with massive debt, and using unlawful debt collection
practices.202 With such high levels of default on non-dischargeable debt,
students who enroll in for-profit colleges often end up with ruined credit
scores and economic instability.203 Algorithmic systems turbocharge the
recruiting practices, ultimately leading to debt and financial distress for
many of these students.204
4. Advertising and Opportunity
The data scraping dynamics discussed thus far are part of “surveillance
capitalism,” which “claims human experience as free raw material for
translation into behavioral data” so companies can predict and even
shape human choices.205 In coining the term, Shoshana Zuboff traces how
big-tech companies learned to transform the digital exhaust emitted by
users into profits.206 While targeting people with ads for sneakers or
headphones might not seem like a threat to human rights, some advertising ecosystems manipulate opportunity, as Pauline Kim puts it.207 That is,
these advertisements can “operate as key intermediaries in the markets
for employment, housing, and financial services . . . to segment the audience and determine precisely what information will be delivered to which
tem/files/working_papers/w22287/w22287.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8CA-4FQJ]; David J.
Deming, Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The For-Profit Postsecondary School Sector:
Nimble Critters or Agile Predators?, 26 J. ECON. PERSPS. 139, 143 (2012), https://
www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.26.1.139 [https://perma.cc/JZ7M-RH5S].
200. Kadija Yilla & David Wessel, Five Facts About Student Loans, BROOKINGS (Nov.
12, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/11/12/five-facts-about-studentloans [https://perma.cc/EFL3-2VGM]; Zina Kumok & Brianna McGurran, What Is the Statute of Limitations on a Student Loan?, FORBES (May 13, 2021, 1:58 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/advisor/student-loans/student-loan-statute-of-limitations [https://
perma.cc/WD2J-QDKA].
201. See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, California Attorney General Sues For-Profit
Bridgepoint Education, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2017, 5:02 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/11/29/california-attorney-general-sues-for-profitbridgepoint-education [https://perma.cc/EE37-H8XA].
202. See id.
203. See Proliferating Predation, supra note 192, at 203.
204. See id. at 228.
205. SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 8 (2019).
206. See id. State and corporate surveillance pre-date the digital age, but new technologies add vastly increased scope, speed, and scale. See Seeta Peña Gangadharan, Digital
Inclusion and Data Profiling, 17 FIRST MONDAY (2012), https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/download/3821/3199 [https://perma.cc/5DZJ-HSLU].
207. Kim, supra note 72.
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users.”208 Online platforms limit exposure to “opportunities in ways that
reproduce or reinforce historical forms of discrimination.”209 Facebook,
in particular, has come under scrutiny. Over 98% of its profits are derived
from advertising, and it controls 22% percent of the market for digital ads
in the United States.210
Starting in 2016, investigative journalists at ProPublica uncovered that
Facebook allowed advertisers to target housing ads at specific, highly segmented groups of Facebook’s users based on race, gender, age, and ethnic
affinity.211 Thereafter, various fair housing, civil rights, and labor organizations sued Facebook, alleging the platform permitted advertisers to target housing, employment, and credit ads on the basis of race, sex, age,
and other protected characteristics.212 According to the allegations,
“Facebook’s advertisement system excluded people with a certain ‘ethnic
affinity’ from seeing housing ads and prevented women from viewing job
postings that employers wanted targeted for men, such as Uber drivers,
truck drivers, and roofers.”213 Facebook offered these targeted ads by
“classif[ying] people into more than 50,000 categories such as ‘English as
a second language,’ ‘disabled parking permit,’ or ‘Telemundo.’”214
Initially, Facebook disclaimed responsibility, asserting that the advertisers were responsible for any discrimination as Facebook was merely a
neutral platform.215 However, the cases ultimately settled in 2019.216
208. Id. at 869.
209. Id.
210. Rishi Iyengar, Here’s How Big Facebook’s Ad Business Really Is, CNN (July 1,
2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/30/tech/facebook-ad-business-boycott/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6HXE-PFCU]; Kurt Wagner, Digital Advertising in the US is Finally Bigger than Print and Television, VOX (Feb. 20, 2019, 9:02 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/
20/18232433/digital-advertising-facebook-google-growth-tv-print-emarketer-2019 [https://
perma.cc/LE5L-RMFP].
211. Julia Angwin & Terry Parris Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 26, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisers-exclude-users-by-race [https://perma.cc/5V2W-8UB3]. Facebook permitted housing advertisers to exclude specific people on the basis of “Ethnic Affinity,” based on
“pages and posts [users] have liked or engaged with on Facebook.” Id.; see also Julia
Angwin, Ariana Tobin & Madeleine Varner, Facebook (Still) Letting Housing Advertisers
Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/facebook-advertising-discrimination-housing-race-sex-national-origin [https://
perma.cc/QN33-ELGD] (explaining that Facebook allowed rental housing ads to exclude
certain categories, including “African Americans, mothers of high school kids, people interested in wheelchair ramps, Jews, expats from Argentina and Spanish speakers”); Julia
Angwin, Madeleine Varner & Ariana Tobin, Facebook Enabled Advertiser to Reach ‘Jew
Haters,’ PROPUBLICA (Sept. 14, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/face
book-enabled-advertisers-to-reach-jew-haters [https://perma.cc/ZK2V-JRF5].
212. Facebook Agrees to Sweeping Reforms to Curb Discriminatory Ad Targeting Practices, ACLU (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/facebook-agrees-sweeping-reforms-curb-discriminatory-ad-targeting-practices [https://perma.cc/D5V7-27YM].
213. See Five Privacy Principles, supra note 21, at 380–81 (internal citations omitted).
214. Id. at 381; see also Angwin & Parris, supra note 211.
215. See Kim, supra note 72, at 884.
216. See Settlement Agreement and Release at 3, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Facebook,
Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2019). The Department of Housing and
Urban Development brought charges against Facebook for discrimination in violation of
the Fair Housing Act, and that case continues. Charge of Discrimination, supra note 94, at
3.
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Under the terms of the settlement, Facebook agreed to prohibit advertisers from targeting people based on a number of categories, including age,
gender, zip code, and race.217 Nevertheless, numerous studies have found
that advertising discrimination on Facebook persists post-settlement.218
For instance, one study found that Facebook was showing ads for secretarial and supermarket jobs primarily to women.219 Another study found
that more men were shown ads for credit, while more women were shown
ads for debt relief.220 One cause of this ongoing bias may be the algorithm’s use of proxy characteristics that correlate with protected classes.221 In addition, the content of ads appears to play a role in
determining who sees them, even when advertisers do not select the viewers themselves.222 Further, some of Facebook’s internal ad-placement systems match ads with users based on users’ Facebook activity and
demographic information pulled from their personal pages.223 In light of
ongoing pressure to counter ad bias, Facebook placed an additional limitation on advertisers in 2021, keeping them from targeting people based
on their interests as inferred from their interactions with Facebook on
specific topics.224
As Facebook faces ongoing pressure to change its advertising practices
further, the settlement (and its ongoing enforcement) nevertheless excludes poverty discrimination. The settlement does not forbid discrimination based on SES; instead, the settlement tracks only recognized
217. Settlement Agreement and Release supra note 216, at 20.
218. See Kim, supra note 72, at 887–92 (reviewing studies); Ava Kofman & Ariana
Tobin, Facebook Ads Can Still Discriminate Against Women and Older Workers, Despite a
Civil Rights Settlement, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/
facebook-ads-can-still-discriminate-against-women-and-older-workers-despite-a-civilrights-settlement [https://perma.cc/SCH6-HKMB]; Jeremy B. Merrill, Does Facebook Still
Sell Discriminatory Ads?, MARKUP (Aug. 25, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://themarkup.org/askthe-markup/2020/08/25/does-facebook-still-sell-discriminatory-ads [https://perma.cc/8GP44R9X].
219. Muhammad Ali, Piotr Sapiezynski, Miranda Bogen, Aleksandra Korolova, Alan
Mislove & Aaron Rieke, Discrimination Through Optimization: How Facebook’s Ad Delivery Can Lead to Biased Outcomes, 3 PROC. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION 1,
21, 30 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1145/3359301 [https://perma.cc/9DTB-FMCF].
220. SARA KINGSLEY, CLARA WANG, ALEXANDRA MIKHALENKO, PROTEETI SINHA &
CHINMAY KULKARNI, AUDITING DIGITAL PLATFORMS FOR DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY ADVERTISING 21 (2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2008.09656.pdf [https://
perma.cc/57BR-938K].
221. See Jinyan Zang, Solving the Problem of Racially Discriminatory Advertising on
Facebook, BROOKINGS (Oct. 19, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/solving-theproblem-of-racially-discriminatory-advertising-on-facebook [https://perma.cc/9FRGQ7S2].
222. See Ali et al., supra note 219. “Where a particular ad appears is influenced by the
advertiser (who specifies its target audience), other advertisers (who are competing for
advertising space), users themselves (who choose whether or not to click on particular
ads), and the platform that coordinates these preferences.” Kim, supra note 72, at 886.
223. See Merrill, supra note 218.
224. See Shannon Bond, Facebook Scraps Ad Targeting Based on Politics, Race and
Other ‘Sensitive’ Topics, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 9, 2021, 5:06 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2021/11/09/1054021911/facebook-scraps-ad-targeting-politics-race-sensitive-topics [https://
perma.cc/VF59-H9XL].
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categories protected under civil rights laws.225 Thus, advertisers may intentionally and legally discriminate against poor people, even in employment, housing, and credit. They can target poor people for predatory
products and exclude them from mainstream opportunities. Moreover,
various advertisements that feed off economic vulnerability are outside
the scope of the settlement, such as for-profit colleges or predatory financial services.226 These gaps in the ongoing struggle between the civil rights
community and internet platforms such as Facebook will continue to exacerbate economic inequality.
III. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW, DIGITAL RIGHTS, AND
POVERTY
This Part explains how and why SES is not protected in existing civil
rights law and how this loophole is perpetuated in digital-discrimination
proposals at the federal and state levels.
A. THE POVERTY LOOPHOLE

IN

CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

The Supreme Court has held that poverty is not a suspect class under
the Constitution for Equal Protection purposes.227 As a result, laws that
discriminate against the poor are subject to more lenient review, “which
requires only that the State’s system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”228 Further, the Court has ruled
that the Constitution does not guarantee core socioeconomic rights, such
as housing or welfare.229 These doctrines impact digital discrimination
wrought by the government. This “deconstitutionalization” of poverty
law230 is significant given that the private sector sells and shares data
troves via interconnected networks and that governments purchase algorithmic decision-making tools from private vendors.231 Consider the
225. See Settlement Agreement and Release, supra note 216, at 20.
226. Proliferating Predation, supra note 192, at 184.
227. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that
poverty, standing alone is not a suspect classification.”).
228. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
229. For an overview of the Court’s jurisprudence with regard to poverty, see Michele
E. Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court Contributes to Economic
Inequality, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 389, 401–10 (2014).
230. Julie Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual
Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (2008).
231. On government reliance on private vendors, see DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM,
DANIEL E. HO, CATHERINE M. SHARKEY & MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 88 (Feb. 2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUSAI-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3DD-WDXB] (finding that one-third of federal AI technologies come from private commercial sources); Dierdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as Policy: Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 778 (2019) (“At every level of government, officials purchase,
or contract for use of, technology systems that employ machine learning . . . .”); Robert
Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 103, 107 (2018) (explaining that local governments lack expertise to develop data
analytics and rely on “privately developed algorithmic processes”). On private vendors’
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case studies above. Public housing authorities sometimes use tenantscreening algorithms.232 Government agencies rely on credit reports in
collecting child support and considering eligibility for public assistance,
government licenses, and employment.233 The Constitution covers public
colleges, so their algorithmic systems must comply with the Equal Protection Clause.234 Yet no viable Equal Protection arguments govern digital
discrimination against the poor in these realms.
For the most part, existing civil rights laws similarly fail to prohibit discrimination against the poor. At the federal level, individuals are protected against discrimination based on “race, color, religion, or national
origin” in public accommodations (i.e., spaces serving the public, such as
restaurants and hotels) and in programs receiving federal funding.235
These characteristics are also covered by employment discrimination law,
along with sex, sexual orientation,236 age,237 pregnancy,238 and veteran
status.239 The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status, or disability.240
The disabled are protected against discrimination in all of these contexts.241 In addition, people cannot be discriminated against based on
their genetic information with regard to health insurance or employment.242 State and city antidiscrimination laws are similar in the characteristics they protect, though they can sometimes be more expansive. For
reliance on public data, see WOLFIE CHRISTL, CRACKED LABS, CORPORATE SURVEILLANCE IN EVERYDAY LIFE: HOW COMPANIES COLLECT, COMBINE, ANALYZE, TRADE AND
USE PERSONAL DATA ON BILLIONS 9–10 (2017), https://crackedlabs.org/en/corporate-surveillance/#3 [https://perma.cc/HPY3-XHDK]; Steven Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here
are the Data Brokers Quietly Buying and Selling Your Personal Information, FAST CO.
(Mar. 2, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90310803/here-are-the-data-brokers-quietlybuying-and-selling-your-personal-information [https://perma.cc/E7Q8-PA4K] (“By buying
or licensing data or scraping public records, third-party data companies can assemble
thousands of attributes each for billions of people.”); JUSTIN SHERMAN, DATA BROKERS
AND SENSITIVE DATA ON U.S. INDIVIDUALS: THREATS TO AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND DEMOCRACY 8 (2021), https://sites.sanford.duke.edu/techpolicy/
wp-content/uploads/sites/17/2021/08/Data-Brokers-and-Sensitive-Data-on-US-IndividualsSherman-2021.pdf. [https://perma.cc/K8V3-ATGP] (describing data brokers scraping public records).
232. Lauren Kirchner, How We Investigated the Tenant Screening Industry, MARKUP
(May 28, 2020), https://themarkup.org/show-your-work/2020/05/28/how-we-investigatedthe-tenant-screening-industry [https://perma.cc/7MQ6-F3SF].
233. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING, 317–328 (10th ed. 2022).
234. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. 570 U.S. 297, 307–11
(2013) (applying the Equal Protections Clause to admissions schemes of a public
university).
235. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a.
236. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
237. See 29 U.S.C. § 623.
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of certain conditions biologically tied to sex, including “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions”).
239. See 38 U.S.C. § 4311; 3 U.S.C. § 416(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for an employing
office to discriminate, within the meaning of [38 U.S.C. § 4311] . . . .”).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
241. See id. §§ 3604, 12112, 12132.
242. Id. § 2000ff-1; Genetic Information Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/genetic-information-discrimination [https://perma.cc/
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instance, in employment discrimination, some states protect against discrimination based on marital status, breastfeeding, medical marijuana
use, or status as a victim of domestic violence.243
There are a few statutes that protect against discrimination based on
factors related to economic status. For instance, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits creditors from discriminating against credit applicants not only based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital
status, or age but also based on an applicant’s receiving income from a
public assistance program (meaning that lenders must treat income from
public assistance the same as other income sources).244 Some states and
localities go beyond the Fair Housing Act’s protected grounds by forbidding source-of-income discrimination in housing, meaning landlords cannot refuse to rent to a tenant because they pay their rent with a federally
subsidized housing assistance voucher or other forms of governmental assistance.245 Several states banned credit reporting for certain employment
decisions,246 and studies show these bans effectively increase employment
rates among job applicants with poor credit.247 Several states and cities
prohibit the use of criminal background records in the initial stages of
hiring, college admissions, or both; these laws are often called ban-thebox laws, and they are designed to expand opportunities.248 These laws
and constitutional protections may be narrow in scope and scattered in
coverage, but they suggest a level of political support for economic-justice
initiatives.249 This momentum should be harnessed and expanded to prevent digital discrimination based on poverty.
B. DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION

AND

CIVIL RIGHTS

Commentators and advocates have concluded that combatting digital
discrimination requires new laws. Simply put, our existing analog-era laws
BTW3-VMWB] (“Under Title II of GINA, it is illegal to discriminate against employees or
applicants because of genetic information.”).
243. See State Employment-Related Discrimination Statutes, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG.
(July 2015), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/employ/Discrimination-Chart-2015.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/689L-PL4B].
244. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691.
245. See Robert G. Schwemm, State and Local Laws Banning Source-of-Income Discrimination, 28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 373, 375–386 (2019).
246. See Foohey & Greene, supra note 122, at 10.
247. See AMY TRAUB & SEAN MCELWEE, DEMOS, BAD CREDIT SHOULDN’T BLOCK
EMPLOYMENT: HOW TO MAKE STATE BANS ON EMPLOYMENT CREDIT CHECKS MORE EFFECTIVE 7–8 (2016), https://www.demos.org/research/bad-credit-shouldnt-block-employment-how-make-state-bans-employment-credit-checks-more [https://perma.cc/2S2G4UPX]; Robert Clifford & Daniel Shoag, “No More Credit Score”: Employer Credit Check
Bans and Signal Substitution, (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 16-10, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2836374 [https://perma.cc/GH2Y2GAL].
248. See BETH AVERY & HAN LU, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES,
COUNTIES, AND STATES ADOPT FAIR-CHANCE POLICIES TO ADVANCE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH PAST CONVICTIONS 4 (2021), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wpcontent/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide-Oct-2021.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6MFW-XVAL].
249. See Peterman, supra note 7, at 1357–58.
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are ill-fit for protecting against the harms of automated systems. As one
group of commentators explains, “algorithms present challenges in interpretation under current antidiscrimination laws, which were written to
address discrimination by human decision-makers.”250 Whereas traditional civil rights laws aimed to address biases harbored by employers,
landlords, and other decision-makers, “in the 21st century, decisions can
be made by machines or software—without a human in the loop.”251
In their groundbreaking article Big Data’s Disparate Impact, Andrew
Selbst and Solon Barocas explained the difficulties of prevailing on a disparate impact claim for discrimination in automated decision-making.252
Title VII disparate impact claims have a three-part burden-shifting framework: First, a plaintiff must establish that an employer’s facially neutral
policy or practice has a disparate impact on a protected class.253 Second,
to rebut this prima facie case, the employer must establish that a legitimate business need justifies the challenged policy or practice.254 Third,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s legitimate business need can reasonably be achieved through alternate means
with less discriminatory results.255 With respect to algorithms, a plaintiff’s
burden is especially difficult because courts have approved hiring criteria
that are job-relevant, and computer models have access to massive
amounts of data that are highly predictive of future performance.256
Moreover, data collection and mining incorporate unconscious biases
baked into current structural disparities, making it difficult for a plaintiff
to identify alternative employment practices that achieve the same goals
and are less discriminatory, as Title VII requires.257
Other scholars have suggested creative interpretations of existing Title VII law to bring digital discrimination into the statute’s coverage,258
250. CAMERON F. KERRY, JOHN B. MORRIS, JR., CAITLIN T. CHIN & NICOL E. TURNER
LEE, BROOKINGS, BRIDGING THE GAPS: A PATH FORWARD TO FEDERAL PRIVACY LEGISLATION 9 (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Bridging-thegaps_a-path-forward-to-federal-privacy-legislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMK3-JJL3]; see
also Erin Simpson & Adam Conner, How to Regulate Tech: A Technology Policy Framework for Online Services, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 16, 2021), https://
www.americanprogress.org/article/how-to-regulate-tech-a-technology-policy-frameworkfor-online-services [https://perma.cc/R8W2-ZFPE] (“The evolution of online services has
outpaced the application and interpretation of civil rights laws to digital properties and
transactions.”).
251. KERRY, MORRIS, CHIN & LEE, supra note 250, at 39.
252. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 33. But see Michael Selmi, Algorithms, Discrimination and the Law, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 618 (2021) (arguing that existing law is adequate to
counter algorithmic discrimination).
253. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
254. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
255. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
256. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 33, at 707–12.
257. See id.
258. See Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519,
525–26 (2018) (arguing that the anti-stereotyping theory under Title VII can be used to
combat algorithmic discrimination); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work,
58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 890–91 (2017) (developing a theory of “classification bias”
under Title VII).
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but courts have yet to interpret the law in such a manner. Accordingly,
these interpretations cannot provide relief for plaintiffs or guidance for
businesses to structure their algorithmic systems. Relatedly, there is a
split among the federal courts of appeals as to whether the ban on disability discrimination in public accommodations applies to online platforms.259 There is similar uncertainty regarding the publicaccommodations protections under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.260 At the state level, “the public accommodations laws of California
and New York apply to online entities, covering both Silicon Valley and
Wall Street,” yet the scope of digital coverage remains unresolved in
many other states.261 With respect to the Fair Housing Act, courts are
split on whether the Act reaches data-processing entities that provide
screening information to landlords, such as credit bureaus and tenantscreening companies.262 Yet another potential barrier to obtaining civil
rights relief is Section 230, which courts have interpreted as immunizing
platforms for discriminatory content posted by other entities.263
Facebook successfully raised this defense to defeat a class action lawsuit
alleging ad discrimination violating the Fair Housing Act.264
The executive branch’s interpretation and application of these laws to
algorithmic systems can fluctuate depending on political priorities. In
2019, the Trump Administration proposed a safe harbor under Fair Housing Act regulations for housing providers that rely on algorithms to make
decisions.265 The proposed rule also changed the burden-shifting framework for disparate impact claims under the Act in ways that favor defendants.266 Over 45,000 comments were received in opposition to the
259. See Katy Brennan, The Internet as a Place of Public Accommodation: Are Business
Websites Required to be ADA Compliant?, COLUM. UNDERGRADUATE L. REV. (Jan. 24,
2020), https://www.culawreview.org/journal/internet-ada-compliance [https://perma.cc/
Z9DH-DF4C]; Mason Marks, Websites Need to Become ‘Places of Public Accommodation’
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, HILL (June 8, 2020, 6:30 PM), https://
thehill.com/opinion/technology/501680-websites-need-to-become-places-of-public-accommodation [https://perma.cc/PJ2S-7JVC].
260. See generally Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations:
Race Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1275 (2017).
261. DAVID BRODY & SEAN BICKFORD, LAWS.’ COMM. FOR C.R. UNDER L., DISCRIMINATORY DENIAL OF SERVICE: APPLYING STATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS TO ONLINE COMMERCE 2 (Jan. 2020), https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/
Online-Public-Accommodations-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD8R-8T7U]. “The public
accommodations laws of five states currently apply to online businesses: California, Colorado, New Mexico, New York, and Oregon.” Id. at 3. However, six states either have no
“general-purpose public accommodations law at all or have a law that is so narrow as to be
effectively meaningless.” Id.
262. See Bhatia, supra note 111.
263. See Bertram Lee, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Section 230 and Civil Rights,
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Aug. 12, 2020), https://publicknowledge.org/where-the-rubbermeets-the-road-section-230-and-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/9SEJ-8YEQ].
264. See Vargas v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-05081-WHO, 2021 WL 3709083, at *4–5
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2021), argued, No. 21-16499 (9th Cir. July 28, 2022).
265. See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard,
85 Fed. Reg. 60,288, 60,288, 60,316 (Sept. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
266. See id. at 60,288; 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2021).
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rule during the notice and comment period.267 While the final rule did not
include an explicit safe harbor for algorithms, it adopted a burden-shifting regime that makes it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to challenge algorithms that are used for tenant-screening reports (as discussed above) as
well as algorithms that make decisions on home financing, marketing,
sales, and zoning.268 In brief, the final rule requires a plaintiff to make a
detailed showing about the “internal workings of the challenged algorithm—information that will generally be proprietary, and thus unavailable to plaintiffs who have not yet had access to discovery.”269
In October 2021, a court enjoined the rule from taking effect, stating
that it “run[s] the risk of effectively neutering disparate impact liability
under the Fair Housing Act” and “appear[s] inadequately justified.”270
President Biden issued an executive order directing the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to “examine the effects” of the
rule and take any steps to ensure that the Act’s purpose is fulfilled, “including . . . preventing practices with an unjustified discriminatory effect.”271 In 2021, HUD announced a proposal to reinstate the Obama-era
standard set forth in its 2013 Rule.272 This controversy reveals the instability of agency interpretations of existing laws written for an analog
world that do not textually address issues of algorithmic accountability.
These ambiguities generate opportunities for political flip-flops depending on administrations’ priorities.
C. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO BRING DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION
INTO CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
Given the civil rights implications of data-centric technologies and the
shortcomings of existing laws, numerous legislative proposals have been
advanced to combat algorithmic bias and to regulate the personal data
market. However, as with the antidiscrimination laws on the books, they
generally do not cover socioeconomic discrimination. Rather, these proposals generally extend new protections to the existing categories of pro267. See Lauren Sarkesian & Spandana Singh, HUD’s New Rule Paves the Way for
Rampant Algorithmic Discrimination in Housing Decisions, NEW AMERICA: OUR TECH.
INST. (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/blog/huds-new-rule-paves-the-wayfor-rampant-algorithmic-discrimination-in-housing-decisions [https://perma.cc/5UE4E9UC].
268. See John Villasenor & Virginia Foggo, Algorithms and Housing Discrimination:
Rethinking HUD’s New Disparate Impact Rule, BROOKINGS (Mar. 5, 2021) [hereinafter
Rethinking HUD], https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/03/05/algorithms-andhousing-discrimination-rethinking-huds-new-disparate-impact-rule [https://perma.cc/
BR2R-CAK7]. For extended analysis of the rule see Virginia Foggo & John Villasenor,
Algorithms, Housing Discrimination, and the New Disparate Impact Rule, 22 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 1–62 (2021).
269. Rethinking HUD, supra note 268.
270. Mass. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. U.S Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 496 F. Supp. 3d 600, 611
(D. Mass. 2020).
271. Memorandum on Redressing Our Nation’s and the Federal Government’s History
of Discriminatory Housing Practices and Policies, 86 Fed. Reg. 7487 (Jan. 26, 2021).
272. Dept. of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Reinstatement of HUD’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 86 Fed. Reg. 33590, (June 25, 2021).
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tected traits. Still, it is important to survey this landscape to understand
where including protections based on SES might make a positive difference for low-income people. Proposals fall into three broad categories:
digital-discrimination laws, data-privacy laws, and algorithmic-accountability laws. To be sure, there are overlaps among these categories, and
many bills take more than one approach.
First, there are proposals to extend traditional civil rights protections
by clarifying that online platforms constitute public accommodations.273
The District of Columbia is the first jurisdiction to pass such a law,
amending its public-accommodations statute to expressly state that it applies regardless of whether the entity is physically located in the District,
thus making it illegal for an online platform to discriminate based on protected traits, including the source of income.274 At the federal level, there
are similar proposals, such as a bill Senator Markey (D-MA) introduced,
called the Algorithmic Justice and Online Platform Transparency Act.275
The Act would, among other things, explicitly extend public accommodations law to “any commercial entity that offers goods or services through
the internet to the general public.”276 There have also been congressional
proposals to expressly extend Americans with Disabilities Act protections to the internet.277 None of these proposals have yet passed into law.
The second type of legislative reform impacting digital discrimination
involves data-privacy laws. Most data-privacy bills proposed at the federal level—as well as existing laws in Europe and certain U.S. states—
include certain civil rights protections because privacy and civil rights are
intertwined: “[I]f discrimination results from the collection and use of
personal information, it becomes an information privacy issue.”278 Generally, data-privacy laws govern how entities can obtain, use, share, and
store personal data while granting consumers greater rights to control
their personal data, such as rights to understand how their data is used,
delete their data, and move their data from one service to another. How273. See BRODY & BICKFORD, supra note 261.
274. Bella Evangelista and Tony Hunter Panic Defense Prohibition and Hate Crimes
Response Amendment Act of 2020, 68 D.C. Reg. 764 (Jan. 15, 2021); “Place of Public
Accommodation” Under the D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C. OFF. OF HUM. RTS. (Dec. 16,
2021), https://ohr.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ohr/publication/attachments/Place%20of
%20Public%20Accommodation%20-%20Factsheet%20and%20Guidance%20on%20New
%20Definition%20-%20121621.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7YR-KXEM]. In a handful of other
states, this extension of public accommodations law was achieved via judicial rulings. See
BRODY & BICKFORD, supra note 261, at 3.
275. Algorithmic Justice and Online Platform Transparency Act of 2021, S. 1896, 117th
Cong.
276. Id. § 3(11)(B) (2021).
277. See, e.g., Online Accessibility Act, H.R. 1100, 117th Cong. (2021).
278. KERRY, MORRIS, CHIN & LEE, supra note 250, at 8. See also Simpson & Conner,
supra note 250 (“[P]rivacy rights are also civil rights . . . wherein mined data feed into
algorithms that are used to profile individuals, make decisions, target ads and content, and
ultimately lead to discrimination.”); Alvaro M. Bedoya, Privacy as Civil Right, 50 N.M L.
REV. 301, 306 (2020) (“Surveillance threatens vulnerable people fighting for equality. Privacy is what protects them and makes it possible.”).
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ever, in the United States, there is no comprehensive data-privacy law.279
Rather, “American privacy laws are fragmented and sectoral, meaning
they cover specific industries, such as health care providers or financial
services companies, or specific forms of data, such as children’s online
activity.”280 As a result, the market for personal data remains largely unimpeded, as personal data is gathered, used, and shared without people’s
knowledge or consent.281 In recent years there has a been a “techlash,”
spurring bipartisan support in Congress for the passage of a comprehensive data-privacy law,282 but the two parties remain deadlocked on certain
core issues, such as preemption (whether any federal law would preempt
the states) and private rights of action (whether consumers should have
the ability to sue for violations).283
By contrast, the European Union (EU) is protected by the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).284 The GDPR is influential in
shaping American data-privacy proposals, and it has real-world impact on
Americans, as many tech companies with international business models
comply with the GDPR even when they are outside the jurisdiction of the
EU.285 Overall, the GDPR places multiple obligations on the entities that
gather, hold, and use personal data (called “controllers”) while also
granting consumers (called “data subjects”) rights to enhance their control over personal information.286 Whereas in the United States, data collection is freely allowed unless a specific law prohibits it, the EU restricts
data controllers to collect data only on a legally granted basis.287 The
GDPR further contains certain provisions that promote antidiscrimination. For example, it limits processing “special categories” of data to specified circumstances, such as when “the data subject has given explicit.”288
279. See Five Privacy Principles, supra note 21, at 400.
280. Id. at 402.
281. See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1880 (2013).
282. See Five Privacy Principles, supra note 21, at 371.
283. See Tatiana Rice, Addressing the Intersection of Civil Rights and Privacy: Federal
Legislative Efforts, FUTURE OF PRIV. F. (Jan. 24, 2022), https://fpf.org/blog/addressing-theintersection-of-civil-rights-and-privacy-federal-legislative-efforts [https://perma.cc/G7GBTF2W].
284. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L
119) 1, 32–33 [hereinafter GDPR].
285. See Five Privacy Principles, supra note 21, at 373; RACHEL F. FEFER & KRISTIN
ARCHICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10896, EU DATA PROTECTION RULES AND U.S. IMPLICATIONS 1–2 (2020) (“Many U.S. firms have made changes to comply with the GDPR, such
as revising and clarifying user terms of agreement and asking for explicit consent.”); Margaret Harding McGill & Kim Hart, How the U.S. Got Boxed in on Privacy, AXIOS (June 9,
2021), https://www.axios.com/online-privacy-boxed-in-congress-gdpr-82fd5462-3ad7-481ab48e-70774ac2bd2d.html [https://perma.cc/T7JF-HY3Q] (“Businesses have already spent
big to comply with [the GDPR].”).
286. See generally GDPR, supra note 284, art. 4(1), (7).
287. See Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and
Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1083 (2019).
288. GDPR, supra note 284, art. 9(1), (2)(a), at 38 (“special categories” including “racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union
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It also gives people the right not to be subject to automated decisions—
including profiling—which significantly impacts on peoples’ daily lives.289
Any recognized exceptions to this rule cannot involve processing the special categories of personal data.290 “It is therefore apparent that [the
GDPR] aims at preventing algorithmic discrimination, as it prevents important algorithmic decisions from being based on data which reveals an
individual’s belonging to a protected ground under anti-discrimination
law . . . .”291 The special categories, however, do not include SES (although some European human rights laws protect people based on their
SES).292
The United States’ major congressional proposals to regulate personal
data are influenced by the GDPR. In 2022, a proposed federal privacy
law called the American Data Privacy and Protection Act (ADPPA)293
gained bipartisan support and advanced in the legislative process farther
than any of its many predecessors, clearing the House Committee on Energy and Commerce by a vote of 53–2.294 Its chances of passage by the
full Congress are mixed,295 but even if it fails to move forward in 2022, it
is the result of intense bipartisan negotiations and will thus be a likely
template for any future bills. In general, the ADPPA requires covered
entities to minimize the amount of data they collect, provides consumers
with rights to control the collection and use of their data, and bans
targeted advertising to children and to any persons who opt out.296 Most
importantly for this discussion, the ADPPA’s civil rights protections prohibit the use of personal data in a manner that discriminates on the basis
of “race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or disability.”297 It also mandates algorithmic impact assessments before covered entities deploy almembership,” genetic data, biometric data, health data, and data concerning a person’s sex
life or sexual orientation).
289. Id. art. 22(1).
290. Id. art. 22.
291. Davide Baldini, Article 22 GDPR and Prohibition of Discrimination. An Outdated
Provision?, CYBERLAWS (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.cyberlaws.it/en/2019/article-22-gdprand-prohibition-of-discrimination-an-outdated-provision [https://perma.cc/W5NU-R6W6].
292. See generally TAMAS KADAR, EQUAL. & RTS. ALL., AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AS A DISCRIMINATION GROUND 8–10 (2016), http://
17october.ie/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Analysis-of-socio-economic-status-as-discrimination-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4ZB-TSCJ]; Sarah Ganty, Poverty as Misrecognition:
What Role for Antidiscrimination Law in Europe?, 21 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 962 (2021).
293. American Data Privacy and Protection Act, H.R. 8152, 117th Cong. (2022).
294. See Rebecca Klar, House Committee Advances Landmark Federal Data Privacy
Bill, HILL (June 20, 2022), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/3567822-house-panel-advances-landmark-federal-data-privacy-bill [https://perma.cc/V3KU-GXLY].
295. See Cristiano Lima, Top Senate Democrat Casts Doubt on Prospect of Major Data
Privacy Bill, WASH. POST (June 22, 2022, 2:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ technology/2022/06/22/privacy-bill-maria-cantwell-congress [https://perma.cc/S24E-5MJR] (discussing objections from Democratic senators concerned about the bill’s preemption
provisions).
296. H.R. 8152, §§ 101, 201–10. As for the two longstanding sticking points between the
political parties, the ADPPA compromises by preempting most conflicting state laws (favored by Republicans), as well as permitting private rights of action to enforce its provisions (favored by Democrats). Id. §§ 204(b), 403(a).
297. Id. § 207(a).
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gorithmic systems with the potential to harm individuals through
disparate impact or by limiting their access to housing, education, employment, health care, insurance or credit.298 The ADPAA does not expressly include considerations of socio-economic status, although its
recognition of the gatekeeping impact of algorithms upon marginalized
populations could possibly be interpreted to encompass socio-economic
distinctions. And, if the ADPPA is not enacted in 2022, future iterations
of the bill could include socio-economic status discrimination among the
express harms that covered entities must assess and limit.
In the face of congressional inaction, four states have passed their own
comprehensive data-privacy laws—California,299 Colorado,300 Virginia,301 and Utah302—and more states are likely to follow.303 The California law is the most impactful due to the state’s size and influence as
the home of Silicon Valley. The California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA) creates three core rights for consumers: the right (1) to know
what personal information companies collect and share about them;
(2) to have personal information deleted upon request; and (3) to opt-out
of the sale of personal information.304 However, the CCPA does not address data in connection with protected characteristics. Beginning in 2023,
the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) will supersede the CCPA.305
The CPRA builds upon the existing rights under the CCPA, but goes further to protect “sensitive personal information,” such as “racial or ethnic
origin, religious or philosophical beliefs, or union membership, the contents of a consumer’s mail, email and text messages,” genetic data, bio298. See id. § 207(c).
299. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2020).
300. Colorado Privacy Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-1301 (2022) (effective July 1,
2023). The Act states, “A controller shall not process a consumer’s sensitive data without
first obtaining the consumer’s consent” and requires controllers to document assessments
of the processing of sensitive data. Id. §§ 6-1-1308(7), 6-1-1309(1). Sensitive data includes
“racial or ethnic origin, religious beliefs, a mental or physical health condition or diagnosis,
sex life or sexual orientation, or citizenship or citizenship status; genetic or biometric data;”
and personal data of a child younger than 13. Id. § 6-1-1301(24).
301. Consumer Data Protection Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-578 (2021) (effective Jan.
1, 2023). Virginia similarly prohibits controllers from processing a consumer’s sensitive
data without the consumer’s consent and requires controllers to document a data protection assessment of processing sensitive data. Id. § 59.1-578(A)(5). Sensitive data includes
personal data that reveals “racial or ethnic origin, religious beliefs, mental or physical
health diagnosis, sexual orientation, or citizenship or immigration status,” genetic or biometric data, and personal data of child under 13 years old. Id. § 59.1-575.
302. Utah Consumer Privacy Act, S.B. 200, § 13-61-102(1). Similar to the other state
laws, Utah’s definition of and protections for sensitive data do not include socio-economic
status. See id. at § 13-61-101(32).
303. See Taylor Kay Lively, US State Privacy Legislation Tracker, IAPP, (Aug. 11,
2022), https://iapp.org/resources/article/us-state-privacy-legislation-tracker [https://
perma.cc/J9V6- 5CM4].
304. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2020).
305. The CPRA was passed by ballot initiative and will be codified under § 1798.100 of
the California Education Code. On the differences between the two laws, see CCPA vs
CPRA: What’s the Difference?, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2021), https://pro.bloomberglaw.
com/brief/the-far-reaching-implications-of-the-california-consumer-privacy-act-ccpa
[https://perma.cc/YX3B-Z3KE].
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metric data, and data collected and analyzed concerning a consumer’s
health, sex life, or sexual orientation.306 The Attorney General of California has the authority to expand these categories through rulemaking and
could perhaps expand them to include socio-economic status. Under the
CPRA, consumers have the right to know when their sensitive personal
information is gathered, along with opt-out rights to limit the use and
disclosure of sensitive personal information.307
The third type of legislative reform focuses on enhancing algorithmic
accountability by regulating automated decision-making systems. These
proposals often overlap with or are included in data-privacy proposals. In
general, these proposals require companies and government agencies using algorithmic systems that impact consumers to identify and understand
the risks of unfairness, discrimination, and bias.308 The primary suggested
tools for making these determinations are algorithmic impact assessments
(AIAs) and audits.309 While they can vary widely in their structure and
goals, AIAs generally involve an analysis of the proposed or existing societal impacts of an algorithmic system.310 Modeled after impact assessments in the environmental field, they aim to bring social values into
technical systems and “create and provide documentation of the decisions
made during development and their rationales, which in turn can lead to
better accountability for those decisions and useful information for future
policy interventions.”311 Audits typically refer to a “targeted, non-comprehensive approach focused on assessing algorithmic systems for bias,”
either in-house or by an outside party or government agency.312 These
accountability mechanisms are important; they impose duties on the entities that benefit from data processing rather than placing the entire onus
on impacted individuals to enforce their rights, which is the model of the
current notice and consent regime.
The Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2022, introduced by Senator
Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Representative Yvette Clark (D-NY), is the
306. California Privacy Rights Act, § 1798.140(ae) (2020).
307. Id. §§ 3(A)(1), 1798.135(a)(1).
308. See generally DILLON REISMAN, JASON SCHULTZ, KATE CRAWFORD & MEREDITH
WHITTAKER, AI NOW INST., ALGORITHMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHW2-G2J2]; EMANUEL MOSS, ELIZABETH ANNE
WATKINS, RANJIT SINGH, MADELEINE CLARE ELISH & JACOB METCALF, DATA & SOC’Y,
ASSEMBLING ACCOUNTABILITY: ALGORITHMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2021), https://datasociety.net/library/assembling-accountability-algorithmic-impact-assessment-for-the-public-interest [https://perma.cc/Z9XZ-5J8J].
309. See ADA LOVELACE INST., EXAMINING THE BLACK BOX: TOOLS FOR ASSESSING
ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS 15–16 (2020), https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/examining-the-black-box-tools-for-assessing-algorithmic-systems [https://perma.cc/U9NX-UTZ8].
310. Andrew D. Selbst, An Institutional View of Algorithmic Impact Assessments, 35
HARV. J.L. & TECH 117, 127 (2021) (“An Algorithmic Impact Assessment is a process in
which the developer of an algorithmic system aims to anticipate, test, and investigate potential harms of the system before implementation; document those findings; and then either publicize them or report them to a regulator.”).
311. Id. at 122.
312. See ADA LOVELACE INST., supra note 309, at 3.
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rare bill that would mandate assessments of automated decision-making
systems for people based on their SES.313 The Act would also direct the
FTC to issue regulations requiring large businesses to conduct impact assessments for automated-decisions systems that make critical decisions
affecting consumers in education, employment, financial services, and
housing.314 Entities would have to eliminate or mitigate the negative impacts of these systems on consumers’ lives. The Bill mandates “an evaluation of any differential performance associated with consumers’ race,
color, sex, gender, age, disability, religion, family status, socioeconomic
status, or veteran status.”315 In addition to the rare nod to socio-economic
status as a protected characteristic, the Bill also requires covered entities
to “meaningfully consult” with relevant internal and external stakeholders and document those consultations.316 The impact assessments would
be submitted annually to the FTC,317 and the FTC and State Attorneys
General would be charged with the law’s enforcement.318
At the state and local level, algorithmic accountability laws have been
proposed to regulate public and private algorithmic systems.319 As with
federal proposals, they generally rely upon mechanisms such as requiring
algorithmic impact assessments or audits.320 Creating task forces to review algorithmic systems and make recommendations is also a popular
proposal for governmental systems. In 2017, New York City passed a law
creating an Automated Decision Systems Task Force to make recommendations about the city’s use of algorithms.321 Unfortunately, the result
was disappointing to many, as the task force could not get the city to
identify the forms of automated decision systems it used. Consequently,
the task force was only able to make broad recommendations.322 For the
most part, attempts to regulate government algorithms have failed due to
313. See Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden, Booker and Clarke Introduce Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2022 to Require New Transparency And Accountability
For Automated Decision Systems (Feb. 3, 2022), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/pressreleases/wyden-booker-and-clarke-introduce-algorithmic-accountability-act-of-2022-to-require-new-transparency-and-accountability-for-automated-decision-systems [https://
perma.cc/3HXB-PDSZ].
314. See S. 3572, 117th Cong. (2022); H.R. 6580, 117th Cong. (2022).
315. S. 3572 § 4(a)(4)(E) (emphasis added).
316. Id. § 3(b)(1)(G).
317. See id. § 3(b)(1)(D).
318. See id. § 3(b)(1).
319. See Khari Johnson, The Movement to Hold AI Accountable Gains More Steam,
WIRED (Dec. 2, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/movement-hold-ai-accountable-gains-steam [https://perma.cc/VT5E-UHYV]; D.J. Pangburn, Washington Could Be
The First State to Rein In Automated Decision-Making, FAST CO. (Feb. 8, 2019), https://
www.fastcompany.com/90302465/washington-introduces-landmark-algorithmic-accountability-laws [https://perma.cc/2RYX-NM26].
320. See id.
321. N.Y.C., N.Y. Loc. L. 2018/49 (Jan. 11, 2018).
322. AUTOMATED DECISION SYS. TASK FORCE, NEW YORK CITY: REPORT 283 (2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/adstaskforce/downloads/pdf/ADS-Report-11192019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DGE-FNNN]. For the shortcomings of the report, see Rebecca Heilweil,
New York City Couldn’t Pry Open its Own Black Box Algorithms. So Now What?, VOX
(Dec. 18, 2019, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/12/18/21026229/nyc-ai-algorithms-shadow-report [https://perma.cc/QR2J-DCJ4].
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a combination of tech-industry lobbying and legislators’ lack of understanding about how algorithms are deployed and impact constituents.323
Lawmakers have had somewhat greater success at the state and local
level in enacting laws that govern private companies’ use of algorithms.324
For example, New York City passed a bill requiring private companies
that use hiring algorithms to conduct bias audits prior to deployment, and
Illinois passed a law requiring private employers to give job candidates
notice that they are being evaluated by an algorithmic system and report
demographic data about job candidates to a state agency for a biased assessment.325 Yet, as with most of the laws discussed in this Section, these
laws tend to cover the traditional categories of protected classes while
excluding poverty.
IV. EXPANDING DIGITAL CIVIL RIGHTS TO INCLUDE
POVERTY AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION
Without a doubt, digital profiling and automated decision-making adversely impact poor people based on their economic status. Yet existing
and proposed laws designed to counter digital discrimination generally do
not extend to SES. Rather, they follow a long American civil rights tradition of excluding poverty discrimination from civil rights laws. There are
several reasons to take advantage of emerging lawmaking around data
privacy and algorithmic accountability to include the poor as a protected
class. This Part sets out the case for banning digital discrimination based
on low SES and considers the likely counterarguments against this proposed expansion of civil rights.
A. A PROPOSAL

FOR

ENHANCING DIGITAL RIGHTS
SES

ON THE

BASIS

OF

In Socioeconomic Status Discrimination, Danieli Evans Peterman sets
out a robust case for including people experiencing poverty in traditional
civil rights statutes.326 As she explains, low-SES people experience routine discrimination.327 She provides examples:
Employers screen applicants by residential address and weed out
people who live in notoriously poor neighborhoods. Municipalities
enact zoning rules for the purpose of excluding low income residents.
Schools place wealthier students in more advanced classes with more
experienced teachers. States require voters to show identification
documents that poor people have more difficulty obtaining.328
323. See Todd Feathers, Why It’s So Hard to Regulate Algorithms, MARKUP (Jan. 4,
2022, 8:00 AM), https://themarkup.org/news/2022/01/04/why-its-so-hard-to-regulate-algorithms [https://perma.cc/N7RF-PQJE].
324. See id.
325. See id.
326. See Peterman, supra note 7, passim.
327. Id. at 1286.
328. Id.
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Technology can make each form of poverty discrimination even easier
but far less transparent. Employers use screening services to weed lowincome people out of job applicant pools.329 Credit-scoring algorithms
lead banks to deny low-income people loans, thereby entrenching zoning
disparities.330 Public-school-placement algorithms favor technologically
sophisticated and wealthy parents.331 Algorithms can be used to gerrymander districts in ways that dilute the votes of poor people and people
of color.332 In short, many existing forms of discrimination against the
poor can be amplified in the online universe.
Peterman argues that the moral values underlying existing discrimination laws apply equally to poverty.333 Discrimination law is animated by
“a moral and political commitment to the ideals of social mobility and
self-determination,” and as a result, civil rights laws “protect traits that
are subject to pervasive and illegitimate social bias.”334 Poor people are
subject to entrenched, long-standing social bias, similar to the biases
faced by protected groups,335 and that bias is embedded in and magnified
by technology. As with race or sex, there can be an immutable aspect to
poverty. There is extreme stickiness at both ends of the income scale—
the status of an individual’s parents is highly determinative of that individual’s economic status as an adult.336 Furthermore, being born into
poverty negatively impacts cognitive and emotional development and is
linked to a range of negative outcomes that can cascade over a lifetime.337 When people fall into poverty from higher rungs on the economic ladder, it is usually due to factors outside their control, such as a
global pandemic, natural disaster, divorce, or job loss,338 making it an
involuntary condition. Further, it can be hard to climb out of poverty
329. See BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 13, at 14–26.
330. Karen Hao, The Coming War on the Hidden Algorithms That Trap People in Poverty, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/12/04/
1013068/algorithms-create-a-poverty-trap-lawyers-fight-back [https://perma.cc/QXK9ECX2].
331. See Matt Kasman & Jon Valant, The Opportunities and Risks of K-12 Student
Placement Algorithms, BROOKINGS (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
the-opportunities-and-risks-of-k-12-student-placement-algorithms [https://perma.cc/QT6TH5T8].
332. Daniel Oberhaus, Algorithms Supercharged Gerrymandering. We Should Use
Them to Fix It, VICE (Oct. 3, 2017, 2:11 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/7xkmag/gerrymandering-algorithms [https://perma.cc/R3CD-V3HE]. Algorithms could also be used as
a tool to flight gerrymandering. See id.
333. Peterman, supra note 7, at 1327–32.
334. Id. at 1326.
335. See id. at 1327–29.
336. See MICHAEL GREENSTONE, ADAM LOONEY, JEREMY PATASHNIK & MUXIN YU,
THE HAMILTON PROJECT, THIRTEEN ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT SOCIAL MOBILITY AND
THE ROLE OF EDUCATION 6 (June 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/thp_13econfacts_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G5B-AYDS].
337. See Hirokazu Yoshikawa, J. Lawrence Aber & William R. Beardslee, The Effects
of Poverty on the Mental, Emotional, and Behavioral Health of Children and Youth: Implications for Prevention, 67 AM. PSYCH. 272, 273–74 (2012).
338. See David A. Super, Acute Poverty: The Fatal Flaw in U.S. Anti-Poverty Law, 10
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1273, 1280 (2020) (describing how people fall into acute, or episodic,
poverty).
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given that low wages and high housing costs push people to assume debt,
often at predatory rates, creating a vicious cycle.339 In these ways, poverty
shares aspects of involuntariness similar to race and sex. As john a. powell says, the “‘discrete and insular minorit[ies]’ today are the poor or extreme poor.”340 In addition, because poverty discrimination and racial
discrimination are interrelated, fighting SES discrimination can have positive racial justice outcomes.341 Oftentimes, discrimination against the
poor is based on racial stereotypes, such as the “welfare queen,” which is
shorthand for a poor woman of color who lives an extravagant lifestyle on
the government dole by cheating taxpayers.342 While “the welfare
queen . . . is a myth,”343 the entanglement of race, gender, and class underlying this stereotype makes it “difficult if not impossible to disentangle
bias against the poor from racial bias.”344 In America, Black, Latino, Indigenous, and other people of color are frequently excluded from accessing the same income, wealth, and social mobility as White Americans
do.345 Despite living in a country of vast wealth, minorities disproportionately live in material hardship as a result of historical and ongoing oppression.346 Black Americans have a poverty rate nearly twice that of the
national rate.347 As a result, policies that discriminate against the poor
fall most harshly on minorities.348 Consider that, in each of the case studies above, the automated decision-making systems have both a disparate
SES impact and a disparate racial impact, among other identity-based
impacts.
In some situations, policymakers disclaim racial motives for discriminatory policies, claiming they are motivated solely by anti-poor bias, which
339. See, e.g., High Housing Cost Burdens in the United States, HABITAT FOR HUMAN.,
https://www.habitat.org/stories/high-housing-cost-burdens-united-states [https://perma.cc/
HG3R-VC3Q].
340. john a. powell, Constitutionalism and the Extreme Poor: Neo-Dred Scott and the
Contemporary “Discrete and Insular Minorities,” 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1069, 1076 (2012).
341. See Peterman, supra note 7, at 1334.
342. Michele E. Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 247, 257–60 (2014) (“She challenges gender norms by failing to conform to
patriarchal notions of a proper family; she ignites racist stereotypes about minorities; and
her failure to succeed in a capitalist society makes her a subject of derision.”).
343. Id. at 263–66.
344. Peterman, supra note 7, at 1334.
345. See John Creamer, Inequalities Persist Despite Decline in Poverty For All Major
Race and Hispanic Origin Groups, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 20, 2020), https://
www.census.gov/library/stories/2020/09/poverty-rates-for-blacks-and-hispanics-reached-historic-lows-in-2019.html [https://perma.cc/KX9M-E2HZ]; Danyelle Solomon, Connor Maxwell & Abril Castro, Systemic Inequality: Displacement, Exclusion, and Segregation, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/systemic-inequality-displacement-exclusion-segregation [https://perma.cc/M27J-PPCR].
346. Creamer, supra note 345.
347. Poverty Rate by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/
state-indicator/poverty-rate-by-race-ethnicity-cps/?currentTimeframe=0&sort
Model=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D [https://
perma.cc/W5WN-9AKD]. Based on information from the Census Bureau, 19.4% of Black
Americans were living in poverty in 2021, compared to 11.7% of total Americans. Id.
348. See Peterman, supra note 7, at 1335.
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is socially acceptable—and legal.349 Discrimination is often intersectional,
meaning structural systems of oppression can impact people across their
multiple identities. The intersection of multiple forms of oppression generates a specific life experience, and as a result, efforts to enhance equality must account for these multiple dimensions.350 By protecting SES, the
“class, not race” defense would no longer be acceptable, and the law
would more fully recognize how discrimination operates. Peterman explains, “Because SES-based discrimination is so intertwined with racial
bias, addressing SES discrimination is part of a comprehensive strategy
for addressing racial discrimination.”351 Given the links between gender
and poverty, we could expect benefits in the fight for gender equity as
well.352 Not only would protecting against SES discrimination “promote
the acceptance of a more sophisticated approach to intersectionality,” it
would also reach people facing discrimination where the “traditional”
grounds for discrimination do not protect them—that is, when they face
discrimination solely due to their social class.353 Notably, there is new
research showing that legal prohibitions on discrimination can make people more sympathetic to protected classes.354 Conversely, as Emily Burke
and Roseanna Sommers write, “when discrimination is tolerated by law,
it can hurt members of the target group . . . . [T]he refusal to outlaw
discrimination sends a denigrating signal about the status of the victim’s
group and plays a causal role in lowering public regard for them.”355
Thus, the absence of poverty as a protected characteristic may be feeding
existing stereotypes and stigmas about poor people, thereby furthering
punitive policies in a cyclical manner.
Protecting against SES discrimination could unite a “cross-racial coalition” with the potential to advance shared economic interests.356 Race
has long been a wedge to split low-income Blacks and Whites, preventing
them from organizing to advance their shared economic interests.357 By
contrast, “[g]iving litigants the option of framing disparate-impact claims
in terms of SES would draw attention to the ways that lower-SES people
of all races share common experiences of exclusion and marginaliza349. See id.
350. See S. Charusheela, Intersectionality, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON GENDER
AND ECONOMIC LIFE 32, 32–43 (Deborah M. Figart & Tonia L. Warnecke eds., 2013).
351. Peterman, note 7, at 1335.
352. See generally Michele Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, 32 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1 (2016).
353. KADAR, supra note 292, at 19–20. See also Sandra Fredman, Positive Duties and
Socio-Economic Disadvantage: Bringing Disadvantage onto the Equality Agenda, 2010
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 290, 291 (2010) (“Paying attention to socio-economic disadvantage can only assist and strengthen the effectiveness of status-based anti-discrimination
laws.”).
354. See Sara Emily Burke & Roseanna Sommers, Reducing Prejudice Through Law:
Evidence from Experimental Psychology, 89 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369 (2022).
355. Id. at 1410–11.
356. Peterman, supra note 7, at 1336.
357. See id. 1306 (“[R]ace was used as a wedge to impede a cross-racial, class-based
political coalition from gaining power. Jim Crow laws enforcing racial segregation prevented lower-SES whites and nonwhites from developing social and political ties.”).
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tion.”358 Across the country, progressive activists with economic and racial justice commitments are taking heed of the power balances
embedded in technological systems and their outputs.359 There is a surge
of labor activism by workers whose lives are controlled by algorithmic
systems, such as Amazon warehouse workers and Instacart delivery drivers resisting the ways that automation ruthlessly pushes them to dangerous levels of productivity.360 “Tech workers, too, are forming unions and
coalitions that unite those building technologies of social control—or, refusing to build them—with the communities harmed by them.”361 Employees at big-tech companies have walked off the job (or threatened to
do so) to resist the development and use of facial recognition technology,
software for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and tech tools to
optimize drone strikes.362 Progressive movements see the linkage between race, class, sex, disability, and other identities, but the law has
fallen behind. Expanding our core civil rights law to include SES would
strengthen movements for worker justice, civil liberties, tenants’ rights,
anti-surveillance, tech accountability, and many other movements linked
to data justice.
Recognizing SES status within discrimination law could also have a legal benefit. The Supreme Court is increasingly wary of race-based classifications, even when designed to benefit minorities and other historically
disenfranchised groups.363 By contrast, because poverty is not a suspect
characteristic, any affirmative steps to assist low-SES people or alleviate a
disparate impact on them would survive any Equal Protection gauntlet.
Recognizing SES status may help litigants avoid “the identity trap,” or
courts’ refusal to recognize that a person’s racial identity, and not another
source of vulnerability, brought about unfair treatment.364 Hila Keren explains that in “reverse redlining” cases (i.e., cases in which minorities are
targeted for predatory loans), courts distinguish between harms attributable to race and harms occurring for nonracial reasons.365 In so doing, they
deny relief to Black borrowers for exploitative lending practices because
358. Id. at 1336.
359. See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Algorithmic Governance from the Bottom Up, BYU L.
REV. (forthcoming 2023), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4054640.
360. See Nantina Vgontzas & Meredith Whittaker, These Machines Won’t Kill Fascism:
Toward a Militant Progressive Vision for Tech, NATION (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.thena
tion.com/article/society/tech-labor-progressive [https://perma.cc/J9YX-VGQD].
361. Id.
362. Alexia Fernández Campbell, How Tech Employees Are Pushing Silicon Valley to
Put Ethics Before Profit, VOX (Oct. 18, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/technology/
2018/10/18/17989482/google-amazon-employee-ethics-contracts [https://perma.cc/GN8ZUBMJ]; Matt Lavietes, Silicon Valley Firms Are Facing a Rise in Anger from a New
Source: Their Own Employees, CNBC (Jul. 8, 2018, 11:58 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/07/05/tech-ceos-are-losing-unilateral-power-rapidly-in-a-new-unexpected-way.html
[https://perma.cc/5T6X-JPAY].
363. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).
364. Hila Keren, Law and Economic Exploitation in an Anti-Classification Age, 42 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 313, 329–30 (2015).
365. Id. at 315.
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they see race as only one factor in their vulnerability as consumers.366 By
contrast, legally recognizing economic vulnerability could provide a way
out of this colorblindness trap and allow for a more intersectional consideration of why certain populations are targeted.
Recognizing poverty within digital discrimination law is all the more
urgent given that the sheer scale of digital discrimination possible via automated decision-making systems dwarfs human decisions. Ifeoma
Ajunwa explains with regard to automated employment systems:
To be sure, human managers hold biases that are reflected in unfavorable employment decisions for protected classes, but the impact
of one biased human manager is constrained in comparison to the
potential adverse reach of algorithms that could be used to exclude
millions of job applicants from viewing a job advertisement or to sort
thousands of resumes.367
It is particularly urgent to ferret out and eliminate societal bias against
the poor in automated systems, as people become increasingly ensnared
in multiple and overlapping algorithmic systems, usually without their
knowledge.
In addition, the permanency of digital data risks trapping people in
poverty in ways that hinder economic mobility. Though poverty is largely
involuntary, for many people it is transient. “More than half of all bouts
of poverty last four months or less.”368 However, digital encoding of
hardship may limit people’s ability to escape acute periods of poverty.
The pandemic has brought this into stark relief. During the pandemic, as
people lost work, millions struggled to pay rent and mortgage expenses
and to cover utilities, food, health care, and other material costs.369 As
they fell behind on these payments, they faced evictions, foreclosures,
utility shut-offs, and collection actions.370 Each financial hardship is a
data point embedded in individuals’ digital profiles, creating a barrier to
future financial stability as lenders, employers, landlords, and other entities penalize individuals based on their digital footprints.371 At the same
time, digital profiling that identifies financially struggling people makes
them targets for predatory marketers.372 Prohibiting SES discrimination
could alleviate the digital profiling of economic distress.
Finally, by ignoring class within law, we risk magnifying gaping holes in
data collection and research about poor people and their experiences. In
366. See id. at 322. Notably, digital profiling helped to fuel redlining in the aftermath of
the 2008 recession. See id.
367. Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671, 1679–80 (2020).
368. Super, supra note 338, at 1291.
369. See MICHELE GILMAN & MARY MADDEN, DATA & SOC’Y, DIGITAL BARRIERS TO
ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN THE WAKE OF COVID-19 29–32 (2021), https://datasociety.net/library/digital-barriers-to-economic-justice-in-the-wake-of-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/F6U6EAS6].
370. See id.
371. See id. at 27.
372. See id. at 34.
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the context of criminal justice, Erica Hashimoto points out that legislators
spend billions of dollars and develop policies and laws without understanding why the poor are overrepresented in the criminal legal system.373 “[C]riminal defendants are disproportionately poor,”374 yet
without knowledge of the underlying causes of this disparity, it is impossible to develop effective solutions.375 Further, the lack of data threatens
the evenhanded administration of the law.376 Without data on “who is
being prosecuted, convicted and punished, and for what,” there is no assurance that “laws are being enforced uniformly.”377 Similarly, as more
jurisdictions mandate impact assessments and audits for algorithms, excluding class as a protected category will deepen the disparity between
digital harms and solutions. Exclusion from data sets and routine data
flows—the phenomenon of living in the “surveillance gap”—can be just
as harmful to people as over-surveillance.378 People who are credit invisible, work in an underground economy without proof of pay and hours,
and are homeless are pushed to the margins of public spaces and subject
to predation while they remain disconnected from sources of social support that could provide economic stability.379 Poor people tend to live on
the extremes of the privacy spectrum, having too much or too little privacy—and excluding SES status from civil rights protections entrenches
this dynamic.
B. CONSIDERING COUNTERARGUMENTS
This Section responds to likely arguments against the incorporation of
SES into digital discrimination law: (1) the nebulous nature of poverty or
socioeconomic disadvantage; (2) the risk that regulating tech will harm
innovation; and (3) the inefficacy of rights to counter inequality.
First, there is a definitional challenge—what is poverty? “Poverty is not
simply a lack of goods or income; it’s a multivariate condition that is
marked by a lack of membership, citizenship, and human concern.”380
Sociologists Matthew Desmond and Bruce Western explain that poverty
is “better understood as something akin to correlated adversity that cuts
373. Hashimoto, supra note 131, at 32.
374. Id. at 55.
375. Id. at 32, 62 (“In order to develop the most successful and cost-effective solutions
for the crime problems we face, we need to target criminal justice programs towards the
people most likely to be defendants.”).
376. See id. at 32–33.
377. Id. at 33.
378. See Michele Gilman & Rebecca Green, The Surveillance Gap: The Harms of Extreme Privacy and Data Marginalization, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 253, 255
(2018).
379. See id. at 257, 280–81.
380. powell, supra note 340, at 1076. See also Shreya Atrey, The Intersectional Case of
Poverty in Discrimination Law, 18 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 411, 416 (2018) (“While some consider poverty to be solely income related, such as the World Bank’s [$1.25] a day definition,
human rights lawyers, development specialists, and leading economists among others have
preferred more rounded definitions of poverty which acknowledge its complex intersectional character.”).
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across multiple dimensions (material, social, bodily, psychological) and
institutions (schools, neighborhoods, prisons).”381 The fine-grained classifications of algorithmic systems capture all of these dimensions of poverty
(though usually to the detriment of marginalized people). Yet laws are
less capable of capturing this level of nuance.
Still, America’s anti-poverty policies use economic-based definitions of
poverty that draw discrete lines for measuring and delivering assistance.
Every year, the Census measures the official poverty rate and sets the
new poverty threshold.382 Government agencies rely on similar poverty
guidelines to determine eligibility for governmental assistance.383 These
measures are necessarily imperfect,384 but they provide a uniform metric
for observing hardship over time. Moreover, “because financial resources
are highly correlated with other components of class, protecting people
who lack financial resources (or who are perceived as lacking them) will
protect, by and large, people who lack education, have low-status occupations, or who were raised by poor parents.”385
Thus, antidiscrimination laws can adopt existing measures of poverty to
identify people most likely to suffer from digital discrimination. It would
be highly ironic to let definitional challenges stymie legal protections
against digital discrimination, given the fine-grained assessments and social sorting that algorithmic systems churn out about individuals. Further,
the lack of a categorical boundary should not be a barrier to banning SES
discrimination. Along these lines, categories currently recognized under
antidiscrimination law, such as race and gender, can also be fluid.386
Many people identify as biracial or multiracial. Some people reject the
gender binary. Still, antidiscrimination law can accommodate claims of
unequal treatment arising along these spectrums.387
Second, any call to add a protected class to antidiscrimination law will
inevitably raise concerns that additional regulations will stifle innovation
in the tech sector.388 For years, the tech industry convinced lawmakers
381. Matthew Desmond & Bruce Western, Poverty in America: New Directions and
Debates, 44 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 305, 308 (2018).
382. Guidance for Poverty Data Users: How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 22, 2021), https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/poverty/
guidance/poverty-measures.html [https://perma.cc/V79E-AFAF].
383. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 87 Fed. Reg. 3315 (Jan. 21,
2022).
384. On controversies regarding poverty measurement, see Areeba Haider & Justin
Schweitzer, The Poverty Line Matters, But It Isn’t Capturing Everyone It Should, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/poverty-line-matters-isnt-capturing-everyone [https://perma.cc/78CP-JKG7].
385. Peterman, supra note 7, at 1341.
386. See id. at 1343.
387. E.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (extending traditional
antidiscrimination laws to cover discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity).
388. See Jonathan B. Wiener, The Regulation of Technology, and the Technology of
Regulation, 26 TECH. SOC’Y 483, 483 (2004) (“Technology and regulation are often posed
as adversaries. Technology symbolizes markets, enterprise, and growth, while regulation
represents government, bureaucracy, and limits to growth.”).
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that “what they were doing was digital magic and that regulatory oversight could break that wizardry.”389 They had the power and influence to
make this argument since internet related businesses constitute 10% of
the United States’ gross domestic product.390 However, in recent years,
the magic spell has been broken. The industry faces a public “techlash” in
the face of a drumbeat of data breaches, widespread incidents of online
harassment, social media misinformation campaigns, and targeted advertising that consumers increasingly find creepy and annoying. Americans
realize that their online and offline behavior is being tracked and sold as
part of a massive, networked system of data for-profit and surveillance.
Indeed, a majority of Americans now believe that big tech should face
more regulation, with 68% reporting that “these firms have too much
power and influence in the economy.”391 The tide has also turned within
the industry. With the rise of varying state statutes and more on the horizon, the tech industry now supports some version of uniform federal
regulation.392
Of course, there are a variety of forms of regulation, of which antidiscrimination law is only one.393 Will banning socioeconomic discrimination
harm innovation? To be sure, this may be the wrong question. If discrimination is morally wrong, then economic impacts are not determinative.394
However, regulation may not require a trade-off. There is ample evidence
that antidiscrimination laws can support innovation and the economy.395
For example, several scholars studied the economic impacts of state laws
barring workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity.396 One study found that firms in states with these laws had 8%
389. Tom Wheeler, The Tragedy of Tech Companies: Getting the Regulation They Want,
BROOKINGS (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/03/26/the-tragedy-of-tech-companies-getting-the-regulation-they-want [https://perma.cc/K99L-X3JK].
390. Simpson & Conner, supra note 250.
391. Emily A. Vogels, 56% of Americans Support More Regulation of Major Technology Companies, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 20, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2021/07/20/56-of-americans-support-more-regulation-of-major-technology-companies
[https://perma.cc/2AT6-95UK].
392. See Monica Nickelsburg, Tech Experts Agree It’s Time to Regulate Artificial Intelligence—If Only It Were That Simple, GEEKWIRE (Dec. 12, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://
www.geekwire.com/2019/tech-experts-agree-time-regulate-artificial-intelligence-simple
[https://perma.cc/VN3G-N3UU].
393. See Gary E. Marchant, Governance of Emerging Technologies as a Wicked Problem, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1861, 1865 (2020) (“Rather than traditional regulation . . . emerging
technologies will require a ‘governance’ approach that expands the categories of responsible parties beyond government to include the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks and also expands the relevant oversight mechanism beyond
enforceable government regulations.”).
394. See Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Privacy and Innovation, 12 INNOVATION
POL’Y & ECON. 65 (describing tradeoffs between economic concerns and privacy values).
395. See id.
396. M.V. LEE BADGETT, ANDREW PAR & ANDREW FLORES, THE WILLIAMS INST.,
LINKS BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NEW MEASURES OF LGBT INCLUSION
3–5 (2018), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Global-Economyand-LGBT-Inclusion-Mar-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/NXC3-FJR9].

2022]

Expanding Civil Rights

621

higher patents than those without such laws.397 The authors concluded
that “discrimination in the labor market imposes significant costs on the
economy by decreasing corporate innovativeness.”398 Another study
found that the quality of entrepreneurial ventures in states that adopted
these civil rights protections was higher.399 There is also significant research demonstrating the economic costs of racism on society.400 According to one study, if racial gaps for Black Americans had been closed
twenty years ago in terms of wages, education, housing, and investment,
the U.S. economy would have had $16 trillion more dollars.401 And closing these gaps today would add $5 trillion to the U.S. GDP over the next
five years.402 Banning SES discrimination is one tool to help close these
gaps in the digital space.403
The third and most potent counterargument is that antidiscrimination
law, with its focus on individual rights, fails to unmask or reform structural systems of subordination and can even perpetuate injustice.404 In
this view, the value of antidiscrimination law is limited to removing formal barriers to equal participation rather than addressing “the underlying
institutional frameworks, or remedy[ing] centuries of disinvestment in
communities.”405 Another limitation stems from a reliance on courts to
implement the nondiscrimination norm, as they are not suited “to the
multidimensional work of implementing social and economic inclusion.”406 Anna Lauren Hoffmann situates this rights critique directly in
397. Huasheng Gao & Wei Zhang, Does Workplace Discrimination Impede Innovation? 3 (June 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://cicfconf.org/sites/default/files/paper_70.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C4C-6JJA].
398. Id. at 5.
399. See Raffaele Conti, Olenka Kacperczyk & Giovanni Valentini, Institutional Protection of Minority Employees and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from the LGBT Employment
Non-Discrimination Acts, 43 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 758, 786 (2021).
400. Lisa D. Cook, Racism Impoverishes the Whole Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/18/business/racism-impoverishes-the-whole-economy.html [https://perma.cc/E6Y9-PGLT] (summarizing research and providing links to key
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the realm of AI and big data.407 She warns that the search for the “bad
actor” in analog discrimination cases will transform into the search for
the “bad algorithm” in the context of technology.408 In either setting, the
focus on individualized blame “reduc[es] a system’s shortcomings to the
biases of its imperfect human designers.”409 Further, by focusing on disadvantage, “we fail to question the normative conditions that produce—
and promote the qualities or interests of—advantaged subjects.”410 In
sum, Hoffmann asks whether an individualized digital rights regime can
ever be an effective counterweight to the power imbalances reflected in,
and reified by, technology.411
In response to the rights critique, other scholars have stood up for
rights, particularly in the context of race. Patricia Williams acknowledges
the limits of rights but argues, “[I]t remains that rights rhetoric has been
and continues to be an effective form of discourse for [B]lacks” and a
source for “politically effective action.”412 Similarly, Kimberlé Crenshaw
explains that, by failing to consider racism, critical legal scholars fail to
see how “the expression of rights . . . was a central organizing feature of
the civil rights movement” and “constituted a serious ideological challenge to white supremacy.”413 More recently, Olatunde Johnson described how rights-based advocacy has led to important litigation
victories “with the courts emerging as a bulwark against potential government excesses.”414 There is also considerable evidence that antidiscrimination laws shape compliance efforts by businesses and government
entities and can lead to decreased incidents of discrimination.415 With regard to poor people, in particular, Julie Nice states that “without rights as
leverage, poor people have great difficulty making political gains, and
without political leverage, poor people have great difficulty obtaining
protection of rights.”416 These perspectives resonate with practicing legal
services advocates (including this author) who need legal tools grounded
in rights to assist clients now and cannot wait for an alternate ideology to
become a reality if it ever does. Moreover, working within the legal system certainly does not prevent advocates from standing in solidarity with
407. Anna Lauren Hoffmann, Where Fairness Fails: Data, Algorithms, and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Discourse, 22 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 900 (2019).
408. Id. at 903–05.
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410. Id. at 907.
411. See id. at 909–10.
412. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 401, 410, 412 (1987).
413. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race. Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1364–65 (1988).
414. Johnson, supra note 405, at 1983, 1990.
415. Id. at 1982 (“Researchers have shown that Title VII litigation can spur change not
just by those subject to the litigation, but that it can have broader effects on increasing the
hiring of women and minorities.”).
416. Julie Nice, Wither the Canaries: On the Exclusion of Poor People form Equal Constitutional Protections, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1023, 1031 (2012) (discussing the importance of
constitutional rights for poor people).
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and providing technical support to grassroots and community-based
movements for structural interventions and justice outside the courtroom.
Indeed, a multi-faceted approach is essential. Adding SES as a protected trait in digital discrimination law does not solve all harms of datacentric technologies for marginalized people. Algorithmic bias is not the
only cause of oppression.417 Poor people are often ensnared in systems of
exploitation and domination where the more privileged are entirely absent; indeed, their privilege removes them from these settings. And yet,
discrimination law assumes and requires a more privileged, rights-bearing
comparator.418 As I have written previously,
[t]he ability to obtain a low-skill job with a living wage, predictable
hours, health care benefits, and affordable childcare is not solely a
matter of purging discriminatory employers from the workplace.
There is an entire sector of our economy that exploits workers regardless of their race, ethnicity, or gender. Likewise, there is not
enough affordable housing in the United States, and thus getting rid
of discriminatory lenders and landlords can reduce segregation, but
it will not solve the structural problem of supply and demand. Public
benefit systems serve only poor people, so a welfare movement that
asks to be treated the same as the rich is meaningless to the social
service bureaucracy.419
Simply put, equality doctrine alone cannot lead to equity because it is
about treating people the same. By contrast, equity is about giving people
what they need to flourish. It requires accounting for “power differentials
and distributing (or redistributing) resources accordingly.”420 Because
discrimination law is not about fulfilling substantive guarantees to life’s
necessities, it cannot eliminate all forms of digital exploitation. It is one
piece in a larger, multi-pronged struggle to shift the power imbalances
embedded in data-centric technologies away from the powerful entities
that control data towards the people whose data fuels these systems. Significantly, civil rights laws can help open the “black box” of algorithmic
systems, which are opaque and inaccessible, and in turn, potentially lead
to equity-focused reforms. At the end of the day, equity requires more
than law; it centers on substantive demands for empowering tech tools,
grassroots resistance to subordinating technologies, a commitment to ethical norms and design justice, and ongoing exploration of technical solutions for oppressive systems.
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V. CONCLUSION
People experiencing poverty suffer digital discrimination based on
their socioeconomic status. Algorithmic decision-making systems act as
gatekeepers to the basic necessities of modern life, such as housing, jobs,
healthcare, and education. In the United States, these systems lack transparency, and there are few mechanisms to hold the entities that deploy
them accountable for their harm. Credit scoring algorithms embed financial hardship and thus reinforce poverty. Tenant screening algorithms
weigh characteristics with no proven connection to renter reliability. Algorithms used in higher education favor the wealthy and prey on the
poor. Digital advertising systems can feed or deny opportunities to people based on their status as financially vulnerable.
These examples are just the tip of the iceberg of algorithmic harms
facing low-income people. Yet American law provides scant recourse to
remedy these harms because poverty is not a protected characteristic
under the Constitution or in antidiscrimination statutes. We are at the
cusp of a wave of lawmaking to enhance data privacy and algorithmic
accountability to rein in algorithmic bias against marginalized people. We
should seize this moment and include socioeconomic status as a protected
characteristic, similar to the protections afforded to people on the basis of
their race, gender, disability, and other recognized categories. This would
enhance economic opportunity for millions of Americans, advance the
fight for racial justice, and generate the data to improve anti-poverty policymaking. It also can enhance technological innovation while furthering
structural reforms for economic justice. Technology should be a tool to
empower people rather than oppress them. Expanding civil rights to ban
digital discrimination based on poverty is one step in the right direction.

